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Abstract
Off-budget public finance in China is an informal system of levies that emerges in response to
local fiscal needs. Off-budget funds serve as part of local government revenue and help finance
local government expenditures. In the real estate sector, local governments raise off-budget
funds by charging many types of user fees on housing development. The user charge revenue is
an important revenue source to finance urban public service expenditures. Some drawbacks of
user charges such as legal ambiguity and the lack of transparency reflect noteworthy investment
risks in Chinese housing development. Thus, a good understanding of the real estate user
charges is critical for foreign and domestic developers who are interested in housing
development in China.
In this study, we have explored literatures about urban public service policies, presented facts
about the current user charge practices, analyzed the costs incurred in use fee transactions,
evaluated the efficiency and equity contributions of the current system, and illustrated important
issues in details by a case study of a single user fee.
Based on our research, we argue that user charges are important financial instruments for urban
public services such as water, gas, electricity, and sewage, whereas the current market is bearing
a lot of transaction costs due to the incomplete legislation and the limitation of institutional
settings. We recommend short-term and long-term strategies for future user charge reforms.
Policy designed for improving the user charge system should be based on the particular
circumstances in China. Reforms should proceed according to the evolution of the entire
institutional environment and are expected to be gradual.
Thesis Supervisor: Yu-hung Hong
Title: Visiting Assistant Professor
Thesis Reader: David Geltner
Title: George Macomber Professor, Director of Center for Real Estate
4
Acknowledgments
Two years may be short in one's life, but I would always appreciate these two years I spent at
MIT, where I saw a new world and met a lot of great people. Many of them have helped me
through their kind gestures on several occasions. To some I may never have a chance to
express my gratitude. But I will remember all these generous people, and their meaningful
encouragement.
I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Professor Yu-hung Hong, for his explicit direction,
unending patience, constant motivation and support. Without his guidance in this thesis, it
would not have been completed. He has always kept his doors open to me for advice in spite of
his busy schedule. His advice has been a great source of inspiration, which will encourage me
to progress further in the future.
I would like to thank my thesis reader, Professor David Geltner, for his assistance and guidance
in this thesis. I greatly appreciate his encouragement when I first selected this thesis topic.
His enthusiasm for research is highly motivating and inspiring.
I would like to thank those companies and organizations I interviewed last winter. Without
their great help, I would not be able to initiate this research. They are: Vanke Co. Ltd.;
Tianhong Chaoyang Real Estate Development Ltd.; China Oversea Property; Taiyue Real
Estate Development Co. Ltd.; Qiyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd.; Property Co. Ltd..; Lingyu Real
Estate Property; Ri Ying Porperty Group Ltd.; Huang Hai City Garden Property Co Ltd;
Qingdao Zhongfang Group; Institute of Real Estate Studies, Tsinghua University; Planning
Bureau, Fushan District, Yantai
I would like to thank all my dear friends at MIT, who share my happiness and have been
supportive for these two years. I would also like to thank my friends from China, who
encourage me to always keep going.
I would like to thank my beloved parents for their care and affection.
And thank Hailin for his understanding, tolerance, and endless love.
6
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 13
1.1 B ackground Inform ation ................................................................................................. 13
1.2 Q uestions Explored in the Thesis .................................................................................... 15
1.3 M ethodology ...................................................................................................................... 16
1.4 O rganization of the thesis............................................................................................... 17
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Analytical Framework 21
2.1 L iterature R eview ............................................................................................................... 2 1
2.1.1 W hy U ser C harge.................................................................................................. 22
2.1.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of User Charges........................................... 24
2.1.3 What should be levied a User Charge - Transaction Costs Theory.......... 28
2.1.4 U rban Services Pricing Rules ............................................................................... 32
2.1.5 Principal-A gent Theory ........................................................................................ 36
2.2 Summary of the Conceptual Framework......................................................................... 38
Chapter 3 The User Charge System in Chinese Housing Market 41
3.1 Background - Dual-track Fiscal System in China ...................................................... 41
3.1.1 Fiscal Policy Reform s 1979-1994......................................................................... 41
3.1.2 Off-budget Finance and Impact in Chinese Cities............................................... 43
3.2 Off-budget Activities in the Chinese Real Estate Market ............................................... 47
3.2.1 The Underlying Incentives of Off-budget Activities in the Real Estate Market...... 47
3.2.2 Current Condition of Real Estate User Charges in Housing development in major
C hinese C ities ..................................................................................................... . 5 1
Chapter 4 Evaluation of User Charge Practices in Major Chinese Cities 63
4.1 Transaction Cost Analysis of User Charges .................................................................... 63
4.1.1 General Description of User Fees in Table 4-1.................................................... 66
4.1.2 Transaction costs analysis.................................................................................... 68
4.2 Efficiency and Equity Evaluations of User Charges in Chinese Housing Development ... 75
4.2.1 Efficiency and Equity Objectives in Urban Public Finance Policy ..................... 75
4.2.2 Efficiency Evaluations of the User Charge........................................................... 76
4.2.3 Equity Evaluations of the User Charge............................................................... 79
4.3 Infrastructure & Support Service Fee: A Case Study ...................................................... 83
4.3.1 Regulation about the Infrastructure & Support Service Fee in Shanghai............. 83
4.3.2 Transaction Costs Discussion and Associated Problems ................... 85
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 95
5 .1 C on clu sion s ........................................................................................................................ 9 5
5.1.1 Important Financial Source at the Local Level.................................................... 95
5.1.2 Tolerable Transaction Costs.................................................................................. 96
5.1.3 Noteworthy Efficiency and Equity Contributions ............................................... 96
5.1.4 Improvable Institutional Settings......................................................................... 97
5.2 Recommendations for Future User Charge Reforms ........................................... 97
5.2.1 Short-term strategies ............................................................................................. 97
5.2.2 Long term strategies............................................................................................. 99
Bibliography 101
List of Figures
3-1 Five source of extrabudgetary funds in 2002.................................................. 45
3-2 Correlation of Extrabudgetary and GDP in provinces in China, 2003.........................46
3-3 Sharing of 3 Types of User Fees in a Housing Development Case in Shanghai.............52
3-4 Government Structure in Urban Area in China................................................60
3-5 The Geographical Relationship of City Zone and Development Zone.....................61
3-6 The Administrative Power of City Zone and Development Zone...........................61
4-1 Important Legal Clauses of Current Infrastructure & Support Service Fee in Shanghai....84
10
List of Tables
2-1 Different Public Finance Instrum ents...............................................................27
4-1 Real Estate User Charges in Housing Development in Shanghai..........................64
12
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background Information
China is perhaps a unique country that has developed its private housing markets in such a
short time. Back to 15 years ago, few people in China would have thought about owing their
homes. Before 1999, most people in China's urban area lived under an allocated housing system
in which the employers (dan wei), mostly the State Owned Enterprises, provided subsidized
housing for urban residents without home ownership. In August 1999, Chinese government
phased out the old housing policy, and declared that all new residential housing units built after
January 1, 1999 would be sold to home buyers. Since then, the private housing markets in
China have experienced tremendous growth. A study completed by the Sinomonitor and the
British Market Research Bureau (BMB) indicated that from 1999 to 2000 the percentage of
homeowners in China urban areas rose nearly 10 percent, from 49.9 percent to 59 percent .
There is no doubt that the housing reform in recent years has boosted home purchase and
construction, and therefore it is taken as a powerful engine behind the rapid economic
development in China.
Needless to say, Chinese real estate markets are filled with promises and potentials for
Ye, Xiannian. 2004. China Real Estate Market-An Overview for U.S. Real Estate Practitioners. http://www.
realtor.org
global investors. According to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Confidence Index
published by the Global Business Policy Council, China had become the largest FDI destination
in the world in 2003, overtaking the United States for the first time. Total FDI inflows in 2003
hit $53.5 billion as compared to $29.8 billion for the United States2. China has maintained its
position as the most preferred FDI location worldwide since 2003. And almost half of this FDI
inflow in China is in the Real Estate sector. Other survey shows that more investors expect to
achieve their profit targets in China than do investors in other big emerging markets, especially
after China joined WTO.
While most confident in China, investors are aware of risks at the same time. Investors
cite the regulatory climate, corruption, intellectual property rights, foreign exchange and capital
controls as the most serious risks of doing business in China. Compared with U.S. and other
developed countries markets, China's real estate industry is still in its developing stage attributed
to the short history. It is especially difficult for foreign companies to do business in China.
Besides the language and cultural barriers, the concerns of foreign businesses may include the
ambiguous laws and regulations, the bureaucratic agencies, not-so-transparent transaction
procedures, and inevitably the complicated taxation and user charge system. Like other
emerging economies, it is a challenging market for foreign companies due to the uncertainties
and policy constraints. Without well-prepared knowledge and research on related policy before
entering into the Chinese market, prospective developers may run into risk of failure.
2 Data from The Global Business Policy Council, FDI Confidence Index, Volume 7, Alexandria, October 2004
3 Asian Real Estate Society (AsRES) International Conference. 2004. Real Estate In India.
http://www.rst.nus.edu.sg/AsRES/india.html
This thesis introduces current conditions of Chinese real estate user charges, analyzing the
existing issues and their impacts on Chinese housing development, which helps real estate
practitioners better understand the investment in housing projects in China.
On one hand, as the major revenue source for financing urban public services, user charges
are critical for the improvement of infrastructure and other urban public goods, which are
fundamentals for supporting housing development and urban growth. On the other hand,
among all the greatest perceived risks of doing business in China, legal/regulatory environment
and lack of transparency ranked the top two4 . These problems are especially noticeable in the
user charge system. User charges may not account for a significant proportion of the total cost
compared to the land leasing fees or construction costs since they are usually not more than 10
percent of the total development cost. However, user charges reflect many important issues and
policy trends in Chinese real estate markets.
1.2 Questions Explored in the Thesis
The major question explored in this thesis is if user charges are good financial instruments
for the public urban service provision in current housing development in China.
To answer this question, we focus on a number of subordinated questions. What kind of
urban public services should be levied user fees? What is the fundamental pricing rule for user
public services and how does it apply to real estate user charges in China? What kind of
transaction costs incurred in the user charge practices, and why? What should we do to reduce
4 The Global Business Policy Council, FDI Confidence Index, Volume 7, Alexandria, October 2004
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these costs?
After discussing the current real estate user charge activities in Chinese housing
development, our final question is what may be feasible to improve the system in the short term,
and what will be long term considerations.
1.3 Methodology
There are three methods employed in this research: a literature review, interviews, and a
comparison study.
The literature review and data gathering from secondary sources: Much has been written
about the off-budget finance in China, including user charges as an extrabudgetary practice in
this large category. This literature provides the overall background about the emergence and
existing situation of off-budget activities in China before I started the research specifically on the
real estate industry. Some studies discuss the user charge system in terms of types, pricing rules,
and institutional settings. They are the fundamentals for this research and give me basic criteria
for judging different types of user charges. The literature on transaction costs theory and
principal-agent theory prepare me with important knowledge to analyze related issues in Chinese
real estate user charge activities. The former one offers a good framework for deciding whether
user fees or taxes should be charged for a local service. And the latter one explains the reasons
causing the inter-governmental interest conflicts and the State-Owned Enterprises issues.
Finally, some articles on current real estate tax system, which is the budgetary source of local
revenue as opposed to the off-budget ones, are important for the comparison study between user
16
charge and taxes.
To obtain the data and facts, I interviewed 11 real estate development companies and
government institutions in four Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and
Yantai. The two biggest metropolises, Beijing and Shanghai, whose status is equivalence to
other provinces have strong economic power, better investment environment, relatively
completed legislation and policy implementation, and more transparent system. Chongqing, the
newest provincial level municipality in China with a high potential in economic development,
has some inter-governmental conflicts caused by the newly formed economic development zones.
Yantai located in the east coast has a high growth rate among the middle size cities. I also got
data of the projects done by the interviewed companies in Suzhou, Hangzhou and Kunshan, three
cities in the booming Yangtse Delta.
A case study is applied to the evaluation of user charges. The infrastructure & support
service fee that is levied in Shanghai is chosen as a case. We discuss this single fee in details
about its regulation, transaction costs, and associated problems in practices.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
Some key issues about real estate user charges are discussed in this thesis.
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction of the background information about China's real estate
housing market boom and underlying investment risks. It provides the big picture with which
the thesis topic is brought up to address user charge issues in housing development in China.
Chapter 2 is the literature review. It introduces basic ideas: the definition of user charges;
17
the transaction cost theory as a measurement to judge if user charges are the best financial
instrument for financing local services; the advantage and disadvantage of imposing user charges;
the basic pricing rule of urban public services; and the application of the principal-agent theory
to issues related to the user charge system. Based on these literature reviews, I construct a
theoretical framework for analyzing real estate user charges, which I apply to Chinese housing
development later on to guide the general decision-making of user charge policies.
Chapter 3 collects the facts in real estate user charge practices in Chinese housing
development, based on interviews conducted with Chinese real estate developers, planners, and
public officials. It first addresses the off-budget financial activities, including user charges in
Chinese real estate markets and the incentives of its emergence and fast growth. It then
introduces real estate related taxes, the counterparts of user charges. The emphasis of this
chapter is to discuss current user charge practices and policies: the user charge types, the user fee
approval procedures, the policy trends, the fees standards, and the user charge deduction methods.
This information provides a basis to analyze the real estate user charges in housing development.
Chapter 4 evaluates the user charge system and is the most important part of this thesis. It
introduces all the user fee items in Shanghai generally. Then it discusses the five types of
transaction costs occurring in user charge practices. Some fees are used as examples to
demonstrate different transaction costs involved. After defining the efficiency and equity
objectives of urban public finance policy, it evaluates the efficiency and equity contributions and
limitations of the user charge system based on previous transaction cost analysis. In the last, it
choose the infrastructure & support service fee as a case study, because it is one of the largest
18
fees in terms of fee's value, and it contains some typical and critical issues of user charge
practices. The legal documents, transaction costs, and associated practical problems of this fee
are discussed in details.
Chapter 5 is the conclusion. After the theoretical research, evidence collection, and facts
analysis, it summarizes the overall user charge practices in Chinese housing development and
proposes short term and long term recommendations for future reforms of the real estate user
charge system in Chinese housing development.
20
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Analytical Framework
From the revenue side, it is quite common in developing countries that government agencies
frequently charge fees for services rendered. From the expenditure side, Bahl (1999) and Gang
(1998) state that the major use of these funds is urban public service financing. In other words,
user charges have become a critical local financing resource. Among the literatures addressing
user charges, there are four key issues discussed: What are the benefits of user charges? What
should be levied as user charges rather than taxes? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of user charges? How user charges should be established and priced properly? The answers to
these questions we found in the literatures in fact could become a framework for analyzing user
charge system. This is the framework that we use here to analyze the user charge system in
China's real estate sector.
2.1 Literature Review
There are several key literatures that have been explored thoroughly and are proven
instructive for this study. Bahl and Linn (1992) analyze the vital issues in urban public finance
in developing countries. More important work they have done is to develop fundamental rules
and amendment methods in pricing urban services. These rules are the basic criteria for
discussing pricing issues in Chinese urban services in Chapter 4. Coase uses an interesting case
of lighthouse to demonstrate different kinds of transaction costs in urban service provisions. In
Chapter 4, we discuss if the current settings of user charges in China have more advantages than
taxes by applying the lighthouse theory to examine the transaction costs incurred in these two
systems respectively. Some economists address specific issues like the principal-agency
problems that are crucial in the levy and collection of user charges in China today. These
theories explicitly explain the underlying reasons caused the State Owned Enterprises issues and
intergovernmental conflicts analyzed in Chapter 4. These three theoretical frameworks and
their applications to this study will be discussed in detail later.
2.1.1 Why User Charge
User charges are popular in developing countries as a supplement to taxation. Economists
examine the benefits of user charges from two major perspectives: efficiency and equity.
Efficient Resource Allocation
Bahl and Linn argue (1992) that the application of properly designed service charges, or
more generally the recovery of urban service costs from beneficiaries, can contribute to an
improvement of resource allocation within and between urban areas. Since user charges are
levied on those who directly receive the benefits from services, they reflect the willingness of
people to pay for the services. It is probably the only way in which the benefits of a service can
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be ascertained and compared with the cost of providing the service. Ideally, user fees force
both sides of the governments and urban residents to make decision to efficient levels: the
governments are aware of how much service to provide, and the residents realize how much to
consume. It serves to limit the excessive demand for urban services, avoiding deficit
occurrence, extensive subsidization of services, or expectation of unrealistically high standards
of urban service. Even if in practices with constraints, it at least pushes the providers and
consumers to prudent decision-making. Thus user charges can serve as an investment guide to
some extent. The application of user charges, or more generally the requirement of cost
recovery, forces decision makers to consider beforehand the ability and willingness of
beneficiaries to pay and to design standards of service accordingly (Bahl and Linn, 1992).
Bird (2005) points out that imposing appropriate user charges is important not only because
of efficient use of services but also because such charges encourage more efficient land use.
From his standpoint, if higher fees are charged to consumers who are far away from existing
services and hence costly to serve, compacted and efficient land use is encouraged other than
urban sprawl. He thinks that this is critical especially for real estate developments because they
rely on land resources intensively. Even though he does not provide empirical proof of this
thought, it gives us some hints when think about improving efficient land use and preventing a
city from sprawling.
Equitable Urban Growth
Policymakers are concerned not only about the efficiency of resource allocation but also the
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objective of improving the equity of urban growth. Service charges can contribute to equitable
urban growth. Even though user charges are often criticized as unfairly increasing the relative
fiscal burden on the poor, Bird (2005) believes that almost the opposite is true in large urban
areas: those who benefit most from underpriced services are those who make the most use of
them. Yet, under-priced user charges are not in accord with the efficiency principle.
Recouping the costs of public services from beneficiaries may be a fair way to finance a
service. In Bahl and Linn's opinion, local tax rates may be too low to redistribute much
personal income. However, local budgets may significantly affect the distribution of income
through the aid of public service pricing. Of course the structure and level of user charges in
fact determine the extent to which low-income people make use of services such as water, sewers,
electricity. This feature also has to be tempered by concern for the efficiency and fiscal
viability of the service being provided (Bahl and Linn, 1992).
2.1.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of User Charges
Bird (2005) suggests that although the apparently widespread and generally deplorable
misuse of fees in China has perhaps obscured the case for good user charges, the efficient
provision of goods and services requires local governments to charge directly for services
wherever possible. The ability-to-pay issue must also be considered here. It may be efficient
to levy user fees; but if the users do not have the income to pay these fees, their well-beings may
be adversely affected. Of course there would not be any perfect public finance instruments in
the world, which is also true with user charges. Understanding the advantages and
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disadvantages of user fees will help us evaluate the trade-off and make better decisions.
Advanta2es of User Charges
First of all, as Bahl and Linn (1992) argue, for publicly provided goods and services from
which the benefits accrue to individuals within a jurisdiction and to which the exclusion principle
can be applied in pricing, user charge is most efficient. This is because user charge collected
from a service is directly related to the financing of this particular service, its earmarked purpose
will be distributed without any interim process. Moreover, comparing to taxation which is
legislation, user charge can be approved within a shorter time and relatively easier to adjust, thus
it may react to the demand and supply changes in the market quickly. Besides, Bird points out
that earmarked charges can reduce pressure on urban finances indirectly by reducing the apparent
need for still more investment in underpriced infrastructures (Bird, 2005). Otherwise without
earmarked sources, these underpriced services on increasing demand may run into further deficit.
To draw the conclusions above, the assumption is, when user charges are levied, the
individuals who consumed the services are easily identified. Thus, user charges are suitable for
public utilities such as water supply, sewerage, power, telephones, public transit and housing.
Most of them are likely to be local with clearly defined consumers. They can also appropriately
be handled either by cross-subsidies among service users or by subsidies from other locally
raised revenue sources.
Secondly, a set of user charges is effective as a desirable source of local revenue. Local
governments may be the ones who are familiar with the social and natural resources of their local
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communities, and should be able to know very well about the allocation of their resources.
User charges only circulate within the local finance system from revenue side to expenditure side
without sharing. They are administratively feasible at the local level and avoid the possible
transaction cost if higher level administrative agencies involved. It appears that local service
charges have become increasingly important sources of local government revenues. One thing
needs to be noted that "absolute autonomy" for local governments in financing local services
using user charges may create interregional disparity; that is, rich regions may be able to have
better services than do poor regions.
Disadvantages of User Charges
User charges also have disadvantages. First, in practice, user charges are not always
efficient for all the urban services. Other important urban services as health, education, fire and
police protection will be hardly efficient if user charges are levied. The reason is that we cannot
define the consumers easily or cannot make the service excludible to avoid free riders.
Accordingly, if user charges cannot refrain from the shirking of free riders, some users may
make smaller contributions to the financing of these services, thereby generating externalities.
Externalities are benefits which are received by the users who however do not pay for the
services. Thus, these users may not consider the costs of provision when deciding on their
levels of consumption (Bahl and Linn, 1992). Local services, such as general local
administration, traffic control, street lighting, and security are local public goods but their
consumption is not exclusive. These services are most appropriately financed by taxes that are
26
levied locally.
Thirdly, for some services especially health, education, and police protection, which are
provided by different levels of government and whose quality should be highly controlled,
should be funded by revenue transfers from state or national government. For these services,
they probably need inter-regional cooperation or better controlled by national or provincial
authorities; therefore it is better to rely on the overall system of financing, including local taxes,
charges, and intergovernmental grants. Purely local financing may lead to under-provision of
these services from a regional or national perspective.
Bahl and Linn (1992) give a table to show the various sources for financing urban services,
which can be a good reference when we consider different public finance instruments.
Sources of finance
Services Local taxes User charges Transfers Borrowingsb
Public utilities
Water supply S P A
Sewerage S P A
Drainage P PC A
Electricity P A
Telephones P A
Markets and abattoirs S P (A)
Housing S P A
Land development P A
Transportation
Highways and streets P PC A
public transit S P (A)
General urban services
Refuse collection P
Parks and recreation P (A)
Fire protection P (A)
Law enforcement P S (A)
General administration P
Social services
Education P S P (A)
Health P S P (A)
Welfare S P
a. P=primary source; S=secondary source
b. A=borrowing is appropriate for major capital expenditures; (A)=borrowing is appropriate for
capital spending, but likely to account for small share of total spending.
c. Development charges are appropriate for drainage, highways, and streets, especially when their
benefits are geographically well defined within a jurisdiction
Table 2-1: Different Public Finance Instruments
Source: Bahl and Linn, 1992
2.1.3 What should be levied a User Charge - Transaction Costs Theory
Economics have been discussing what types of urban services should be charged user fees
rather than taxes. In Bahl and Linn's studies, there are four objectives to help make the
decision: efficient, financial, administrative, and equity objectives. They tend to dominate
policy decisions regarding the level and structure of user charges. User charges should be
chosen if it is efficient, has financial merits, is administratively feasible and improves equity
growth. These four objectives can be transformed into the evaluation of transaction costs
occurred in service provisions. North defines transaction costs as the costs of specifying what
is being exchanged and of enforcing the consequent agreements (North, 1994). In the economic
markets, transaction costs are specified by the valuable attributes, which are the physical (size,
weight, color, etc.) and property-rights dimensions, of goods and services or the performance of
agents. However, measuring and enforcing agreements are difficult.
Lighthouse Case and Transaction Costs
R. H. Coase (1974) uses an example of lighthouse to demonstrate five different types of
transaction costs.
Cost of Identifying the Transacting Parties
Transaction costs may appear when parties in a transaction are hard to identify. To define
the transacting parties whom the service is delivered to, policymakers can charge all the
beneficiaries and avoid free riders. When the users are individuals within a jurisdiction, or the
service only benefits a particular group but is useless to others, the transaction cost of identifying
the involved parties may be low. However, sometimes the parties using the service are very
hard to define, or there may be some services that free riders are inevitable. For example,
anybody can enjoy the benefit provide by streetlights, but it will be extremely costly to find out
exactly whom use the service. The transaction cost of employing user charges to recover the
costs of providing this service will be high.
In the lighthouse case, it was obvious that the anchor party was ship owners who needed the
lighthouse at night. They needed this service but nobody else did. It was convenient to charge
the ship owners who entered the port. But for those who only passed by along the cost, it was
not so easy to identify and charge them.
Cost of Evaluating the Service
In some sense, the user charge acts as a price for the service. It could be charged by the
units consumed, either volumes or times. How should a service be evaluated, and what is the
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fair price? It depends on the marginal cost in the market. For instance, to evaluate the
marginal cost of tap water, we need to know how much each ton of water will cost for water
pipes, labor, and related administration, etc. In some cases, calculating the marginal cost may
be very difficult and costly. The cost-benefit relationship is not always clear; thus there may be
subsidies involved in pricing the service. The marginal cost may also be distorted because of
the inefficiency of the producer.
In Coase's studies, the user charges that the ship owners paid were based on the
construction and maintenance costs of the lighthouses. It could be calculated to evaluate the
service. It might be low compared to the merchandise they shipped, so the ship owners would
not mind how accurate it was and would pay anyways.
Cost of Negotiation
Since the service provision is based on who would offer a service and levy a fee, and who
would receive the service and pay the fee, parties involved need to negotiate the different
conditions for the user charge. The parties have to agree on, for instance, the quality of the
service provided, the level of the user fee, or other related issues. A lot of efforts including time,
money and personal may be involved in negotiation. All the inputs required to reach consensus
are transaction cost of negotiation. Basically, if there is a great deal of controversy, or much of
the benefit goes to only one party, negotiation may last a long time and is hard to have an
agreement. If the negotiating parties have strong desire for working with each other, they most
likely would compromise. More important, negotiation rules are critical to save transaction
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costs. With a set of generally agreed upon rules, parties have benchmarks to make judgments
and decisions, and do not have to renegotiate on every detail when disagreements arise.
In the lighthouse case, the ship owners had the strong incentive to pay user charges because
they wanted to avoid accidents at night. The government would build and maintain lighthouse
to have ship owners feel comfortable coming at night, which apparently was good for thriving
the development of the port and commerce of the city. These incentives for both parties to
deal with each other lowered the negotiation costs. Furthermore, there were some rules that the
government set to regulate the management of lighthouses. Those rules might also have
minimized the negotiation costs.
Government Cost
As mentioned above, if the government has established a set of rules or regulations, the
negotiation cost will reduce to a great extent. For example, the government may found a legal
process to propose and approve the user fees; it provides basic standards in pricing services; or it
sets up supervisory agencies to monitor transactions. Hence, public expenditures are generated
when the government founds these institutions. To create suitable and completed institutional
settings, the government invests time and capital to initiate rules and regulations. Supervision
and management of these settings also incur high costs.
Enforcement Cost
There is no perfectly efficient world; so no matter how enthusiastic people response to a
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service and how strong their willingness is to pay for it, there must be some free riders who
succeed in avoiding payments. Free riders produce externalities on other people, distort the
market equilibrium, and discourage compliance. Economists have been striving hard for a good
solution to refrain the shirking of free riders; but still, the government must put a lot of efforts in
stopping free ridership by setting up laws to enhance user fee compliance. So enforcement
costs of implementing user charges are usually very high. However, if the payment is relatively
low compared to the benefit, then most people may not mind paying user charges, which was the
case of lighthouse with low enforcement cost.
2.1.4 Urban Services Pricing Rules
The key issue of user charges is how to price urban services. According to Bahl and Linn
(1992), there are six interest groups usually involved in and affected by decisions regarding user
charges, the recipients or beneficiaries, the nonbeneficiaries but pay, the managers, local
politicians, higher-level authorities, and the international institutions providing monetary or
technical assistance. The institutional settings determine the ways in which these interest
groups can intervene into the process of setting user charges.
Basic Pricing Rule
Bahl and Linn (1992) discuss the basic principle of pricing urban services. Despite the
complexity of the whole public service system, they argue that the same basic principles should
apply to all services, regardless of the specifics of supply and demand, or varied institutional
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situations. Their study focuses on four concerns in pricing urban services: efficiency, fiscal
constraints and their implications for financial viability, equity and growth, and political and
administrative feasibility. The basic rule of efficient pricing is that the price of a public service
should be set equal to the marginal cost of producing the service, thus allocating resources
efficiently in that it identifies the level of output that produces the greatest net benefit from
service provision (Bahl and Linn, 1992). However, for each dimension of consumption, access
and use, different private decisions and marginal costs are involved, so they should reflect
different marginal cost respectively. For example, we should judge if it is the consumption of a
service output such as potable water, electricity, waste disposal, education, or health; if it is
access or connection to a service such as water, electricity or telephones; if it is the opportunity
to use or to connect to a service.
Amendments to the Rule
Due to the constraint of imperfect market, the marginal cost pricing rule need to be adjusted.
This is not because the rule itself is at issue, but the assumptions on which the basic rule rests are
often not satisfied. These amendments aim at dealing with different issues as externalities,
distortions in input and output prices, imperfect consumer information, administrative and
transaction costs, capital indivisibility, and efficiency in production.
Externalities
Externalities are benefits and costs which are not received by the service user but by other
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members of society, and which are therefore not taken into consideration by the user in deciding
to consume or seek access to the service. As a result over- or under-consumption of the service
occurs if service prices are set equal to private marginal cost. For example, for education, for
which the consumption of a unit of service confers a benefit on society at large, it should be
charged a price below marginal cost so that consumption is stimulated to a socially optimal level.
It is not sufficient merely to cite the likelihood of external benefits for subsidized provision of
services. We also need to know the dimension of service provision that is conveying the
externalities; the extent of externalities, in at least rough quantitative terms; and whether there
are capacity constraints which require price rationing (Bahl and Linn, 1992).
Distortions in Input and Output Prices
If marginal conditions for efficient allocation of resources are not satisfied in some part of
the economy, setting the price of a service equal to marginal social cost will not necessarily lead
to an increase in welfare. This causes the problem of the second best. Taxations may be one
of the factors preventing the marginal rate of transformation from equaling the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption. The concept of marginal cost therefore should be reinterpreted as
meaning not a service's marginal market cost but its marginal opportunity cost to society, that is,
the cost of output forgone in providing an additional unit of it. Shadow pricing requires
adjusting the relative prices of all tradable commodity inputs by eliminating any tariff and tax
distortions to which they may be subject and evaluating nontradable inputs in particular
primary factors of production such as land, labor, and capital in terms of the opportunity cost
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of output forgone by their use in the context of the provision of the service. For instance, the
shadow wage is set below the market wage in the presence of underemployment (Bahl and Linn,
1992).
Imperfect Consumer Information
The basic marginal cost pricing rule assumes that consumers have all the information
required to understand the effect of all current price structures and to forecast changes in prices
that will occur because of their consumption decisions. This is apparently not true due to the
constraints to have perfect consumer information. Optimal pricing policy must consider that
current prices affect consumer expectations and that these expectations in turn affect current
private investment decisions, which affect future consumption. We should make an effort to
improve consumer information by informing consumers of planning price trends. We could
also refine pricing and metering schemes to adjust the imperfect consumer information issues.
Other considerations
Besides the above amendments, pricing in urban services also should consider location
differences. There are three kinds of spatial cost differences: sectoral (rural and urban areas
compared), interregional (one region or city compared with another), and intraregional
(neighborhoods within a region or city compared) (Bahl and Linn, 1992). These special
differences may occur because of variations in marginal cost of providing public services, natural
resource availability, input costs, technologies, size of operation, density of population and
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topography. An efficient system of service prices should reflect these location cost
differentials.
Past pricing practices is important as it influence the desirability and feasibility of changes
in pricing schemes. As Bahl and Linn point out, it is important to know whether administrative
and technical conditions permit the introduction of a new scheme. Furthermore, new pricing
practices may require legal changes that may involve cumbersome legislation. Past pricing
practices, therefore, influence to a considerable extent how well and how fast user charges can be
reformed.
2.1.5 Principal-Agent Theory
Some literatures related to the principal-agent theory address current problems with State
Owned Enterprises and alternatives with institutional settings in Chinese market. Urban
institution settings in China have been changed a great deal. Qian (1999) examines the
institutional foundations over the past two decades. He argues that to complete its transition
from a planned system to a market economy, China still faces serious challenges, especially in
transforming its financial system and State Owned Enterprises and in establishing the rule of law.
He projects that considerable growth is possible with sensible but not perfect institutions, and
that some unconventional "transactional institutions" can be more effective than the best practice
institutions for a period of time. Deng (2004) also studies emerging urban institutions from an
efficiency perspective. He argues that the devolution of some land use controls to districts or
even street offices may be desirable and many so-called community services may be more
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efficiently provided at larger scale or by private companies.
Principal-agent problems are discussed frequently among those institutional issues. The
principal-agent theory arises in a business management context associated with behavioral
studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee interactions but it can be applied to public
and non-profit settings as well. It concerns the relationship between a principal (shareholder)
and an agent of the principal (company's managers). The problem of motivating one party to
act on behalf of another is known as "the principal-agent problem". The central dilemma
investigated is how to get the employee or contractor to act in the best interests of the principal
when the employee or contractor has an informational advantage over the principle and ahs
different interests from the principle (Ross, 1973 and Sappington, 1991).
Among the institutional settings in China, there are two types of principal-agent problems
observed. The first one happens between the higher and lower level of governments. Similar
as an agent role, the lower levels of government lack motivation to collect user fees and to
improve compliance when those collections will be handed over to the higher levels of
government. There is de facto profit sharing with local governments through negotiation of
preferential financial burdens, either taxes or user charges, with enterprises, and through
collusion to transfer taxable revenues to extrabudgetary accounts (Bahl, 1999). The other type
of agent problem arises between State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and the government.
Specifically, the SOEs we discuss in this thesis refer to those that provide urban public services.
This problem is widely observed and studied. Qian (1996)'s and Zhang (1998)'s studies show
that since the ultimate control rights still remain in the hands of the Party and the government,
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the SO Es sometimes act more like the government's agencies, not an independent corporation.
Political interference is inevitable in the operation and business development of these Enterprises,
which leads to economic distortion. Largely subsidized by the government, it results in
insufficient competition, inappropriate pricing, and non-performing investment. Redundant
firm structures and close connections with local government also foster corruption of
government officials and enterprise leaders. Moreover, some of urban services are provided by
SOEs, but the related user charges are collected by the government, the SOEs accordingly lack
the incentive to price their service efficiently.
2.2 Summary of the Conceptual Framework
From the literature review, we propose a conceptual framework for the user charges system
in Chinese real estate market. As the previous studies done by economists show, user charges
are the most efficient method to use on public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity supply,
sewerage, TV, and telephones. In fact, most of these items are now under the user charges
system in China. However, some urban services such as health, education, and fire and police
protection, which are better financed by general taxes, are totally or partially provided under user
charge systems. Some of them may already have the problems implied in the above mentioned
studies, and adjustments are needed. We will discuss these issues carefully in later part of this
thesis.
Pricing user charges is a big problem in China. Apparently the evaluation of marginal cost
is a basic rule in user charges pricing. The marginal cost can be setup by authorities in charge
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of these services. Moreover, according to the imperfect market conditions and institutional
settings, pricing in user charges need to be adjusted very carefully based on the marginal cost
first observed. Besides, since China is a large country, location differences should be
considered when setting user charges.
Appropriate institutional settings should be set to enhance the implementation of user
charges. Regulations are required to exclude free riders, and compliance should be encouraged
and advertised. Another important task for institutional settings is to deal with the
principal-agent problems between higher and lower levels of government. An efficient
administrative system is necessary to guarantee user charges to launch in the right track.
The SOE issue is historically a problem which still needs effective institutional settings to
increase productivity. Thus, it is also one of the key issues for applying user charges.
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Chapter 3
The User Charge System in Chinese Housing Market
As we already stated in Chapter2, past pricing practices is very important because it
influences the desirability and feasibility of changes in the system. Past practices decide
whether administrative and technical conditions permit the introduction of a new scheme,
whether the legislation is ready for related changes, and to what extent the reform can be
implemented successfully. In this chapter, we are going to understand the background of the
emergence of extrabudgetary funds that includes user fees and the current condition of user
charge practices.
3.1 Background - Dual-track Fiscal System in China
The original emergence and the fast growth of users fees in Chinese real estate market have
been grounded on the fundamental basis and financial background the dual-track fiscal
policy in this country. The dual-track here refers to the two sources of Chinese government
revenue, budgetary and off-budgetary funds, which both are important financial supports of the
government expenditures.
3.1.1 Fiscal Policy Reforms 1979-1994
In China, the major governmental budgetary funds come from taxation. In 2003, the tax
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income is 1,160 billion yuan (About US$140 billion), accounting for 97.8 percent of the
budgetary revenue.5  Before 1978, all levels of government depended on profit remittances
form State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) to cover the expenditures of public services. The most
influential fiscal policy reforms started in 1978, right after the launch of opening policy. The
first reform introduced an income tax on SOE in 1984. It was a contract-based system,
allowing the tax system to operate along with a Contract Management Responsibility System
(Hussain and Zhuang, 1998). In 1988, facing a steep fiscal decline and lacking the capacity to
monitor tax collection efforts at the local levels, the central government launched a further
system of fiscal contracts with localities. These contracts stipulated a lump-sum remittance to
the center from each province. The remittance increased annually by a set rate, with any
additional revenues after the remittance accruing to the province. In return, provinces accepted
responsibility for meeting their expenditure requirements from retained revenues, which marked
the beginning of local governments' retention of a portion of their local shared income that
exceeded public expenditures.
The well known comprehensive fiscal reform was the 1994 taxation reform. Since then,
central-local fiscal relations have been restructured according to a Tax Sharing System (TSS),
which is a combination of tax sharing on a derivation basis and own revenue assignment (Hong,
2003). One significant consequence led by 1994 reform was the change of revenue sharing
between the central and local governments. It decreased the revenue share of the local
5 Chinese Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 2004
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governments from 78.0 percent in 1993 to 44.3 percent by the end of 1994.6 However, in the
process of reform, the reallocation took place on the revenue side, but relatively little attention
was paid to the expenditure side. The locus of expenditures even shifted toward the lower
levels of government. In 2003, the revenue sharing between the central and local governments
is 54.6 percent to 45.4 percent, but the expenditure sharing is 30.1 percent to 69.9 percent.7
Since the ability of local governments to absorb more responsibility varies widely, some local
government budgets had ran into deficits. Due to the huge fiscal gap, the pressure of localities
to find alternative revenue sources at the local level stimulated the fast expansion of off-budget
finance.
3.1.2 Off-budget Finance and Impact in Chinese Cities
The off-budget activities are part of a dual-track system of government finance, that is, an
informal system of quasi-taxes and levies that emerges in response to local fiscal needs.
Off-budget funds consist of extrabudgetary funds and other non-budgetary revenues of local
governments and administrative agencies, including users fees, tax surcharges, bond issues,
income from sales of state assets, a variety of local levies, and profit remittances of local
enterprises (Bahl, 1999). There are two forms of extrabudgetary revenues. The one is taken
from a direct form, earmarked taxes and charges; the other is an indirect form, the retained
earnings of locally owned state enterprises. Actually extrabudgetary funds are common in
6 Chinese Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 2004
7 Chinese Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 2004
fiscal systems in planned economies. They were originally created to provide a supplementary
source of funds outside of budgetary appropriations for the discretionary use of local
governments, administrative agencies, and enterprises. Later, user fees and local surcharges
that were meant to be retained for local use were also placed under extrabudgetary funds, to
separate them from general revenues that were shared with the central government (Wong,
1998).
Data from the Ministry of Finance show that from 1994 to 2002, these funds have grown
rapidly from 3.98 percent to 4.27 percent, and accounted for 19.16 percent of total government
revenues in 2002.8 However, off-budget funds are widely used at local levels. In 2002, the
off-budget revenue sharing between the central and localities is 9.8 percent to 90.2 percent, and
the expenditure sharing from the off-budget source is 6.8 percent to 93.2 percent.9 In addition,
since there are also Self Raised Funds and other off-budget funds that are not included in
extrabudgetary funds statistics, the total amount of off-budget funds should have been larger and
more critical than what the above numbers have indicated. In fact, at the township level, except
for some insufficient budgetary allotments for schools and clinics, all other expenditures depend
on off-budget local funding (Gang, 1998).
According to the Ministry of Finance, the sources of extrabudgetary funds are categorized
into five items: revenue of administrative units and institutions, government funds, self-raised
funds by township government, revenue of local government, revenue of SOEs and their
s Calculated from the data provided by Ministry of Finance, People's Republic of China
Chinese Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 2004
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administrative departments, and miscellaneous. Revenue of administrative units and
institutions is the most important component, which account for about 70% of the total
extrabudgetary revenuel (Fig. 3-1).
1. 61% 11. 63%
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6. 07%
8. 39%
72. 29%
ERevenue of administrative units and instituations
* Revenue of Government funds
* Self-raised funds by township government
* Revenue of local government
URevenue of state-owned enterprises and their administrative department
EMiscellaneous
Fig. 3-1: Five source of extrabudgetary funds in 2002
Source: converted from the data provided by Ministry of Finance, People's Republic of China
The use of extrabudgetary revenues is controversial. Bahl (1999) suggested that it is a way
for local governments to claw back some autonomy, to free expenditures from strict central
mandates, and to increase the overall rate of revenue mobilization. When properly and
responsibly managed, fees and fines are governed by local regulations and are used for
well-defined local public purposes. Overall, among 31 provinces and regions in China 1, the
extrabudgetary revenue and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have strong correlation (Fig. 3-2).
As the 2003 data shows, the first four provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang)
with the highest extrabudgetary revenue also had the highest GDP. And the last four provinces
10 Including the central and local governments.
" Including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, and 27 provinces.
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(Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia, Hainan) with the least extrabudgetary revenue had the lowest GDP. It
is not clear if the heavy reliance on EBFs facilitates economic growth, or the strong economic
growth enables a profitable off-budget practice. But it implies the correlation between
economic improvement and off-budget finance instrument, which is somehow the reason that the
off-budget practice of lower level governments sometimes is even tolerated by higher-level
governments.
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Fig. 3-2: Correlation of Extrabudgetary and GDP in provinces in China, 2003
Source: converted from the data provided by Ministry of Finance, People's Republic of China
However, as a by-product of the fiscal reform and a "back door" of fiscal control, some
economists view the extrabudgetary activities as negative for the economy. They claim that
extrabudgetary funds consisted of the fees and levies have been widely criticized as unregulated,
excessive and lack of transparency.
............ 
3.2 Off-budget Activities in the Chinese Real Estate Market
From the entire Chinese fiscal system, we move on to take a closer look at the off-budget
activities in the real estate market. The underlying incentives of the off-budget practices in this
field are decided by the attributes of the real estate development, explaining why user charge, the
major off-budget practice related to real estate, is so popular in this market. And then we
collect facts in many aspects to demonstrate the current situation of user charge practices in
Chinese real estate market.
3.2.1 The Underlying Incentives of Off-budget Activities in the Real Estate
Market
Since1998 when in-kind housing assignment was suspended, the real estate market has
developed dramatically with the deepening of housing reform in cities and towns. Today in
Beijing, increases in real estate investments remain steadily, and the housing prices are high.
From 2003 to 2005, housing prices increased by 21.7 percent 12 . The real estate boom boosts
the demand for building materials, constructions, and urban public services. Financial impacts
of real estate development on the economy have been growing rapidly as well. For example, in
2004 in Beijing, the total investment of real estate development was 147.7 billion RMB (US$ 18
billion). It accounted for 58.3 percent of the total fixed asset investment (252.8 billion RMB)
12 Statistician information net. 2005. Monthly report for Beijing real estate market. Retrieved from
http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/gcfx/tjbgjzl/zhjj/.
and has a growth rate of 22.5 percent comparing to 2003. The total output of the real estate
13industry increased by 15.7 percent in 2004 . Understandably, as one of the fastest growing
industries, real estate has been viewed to have extensive off-budget activities. There are some
underlying causes to motivate the user fees and other funds collection in real estate development.
Relatively Low Taxation Revenue from the Real Estate Industry
Some people argue that, compared to the fast economic expansion of the real estate market,
the government does not collect much tax revenue. Taxes related to real estate industry only
have very few types, and their total revenue is relatively low comparing to the high return of this
industry. Depending on definition, there are at least six types of real property related taxes in
China. They are Land Value Increment Tax, Urban and Township Land Use Tax, Farmland
Occupancy Tax, Building Tax, Urban Real Estate Tax (only for foreigners), and Deed Tax.
From the perspective of real estate companies, they need to pay additional six types of taxes,
Business Tax, Income tax of all enterprises, Personal Income Tax, Stamp Duties, City
Maintenance and Construction Tax, Fixed asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999), and
additional education surtax.
Even though the fast pace of real estate industry in many Chinese cities are favorable, there
are still some smaller cities that are at the initial stage of the development. As a national wide
standard, taxation standard can only reach the bottom line so as to cover those less developed
1 Statistician information net. 2005. The evaluation for 2004 Beijing real estate market. Retrieved from
http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/gcfx/tjbgjzl/zhjj/..
area, but it may be insufficiently collected in rich cities. Therefore, even adding up all types of
taxes directly or indirectly related to real estate development, it has been argued that taxation on
real estate is comparatively low. Further more, there are no other taxes that can allow the
government to benefit from the increasing economic activities in the real estate sector. In 2002,
the collection from the first 6 types of taxes only accounted for 2.36 percent of the total tax
revenue in China, and accounted for 8.12 percent of the local government income (Development
Research Center of the State Council, 2005). This proportion was far less than that in the U.S.
where the tax on real property is the largest revenue source for municipalities or school districts.
Intuitively we may think that the thriving real estate industry must be a sector that
government relies on heavily to generate revenue, which contrarily can not be achieved due to
the existing tax system. This situation stimulates the extensive off-budget activities. In the
real estate industry, it is in the form of user charges imposed on the developers. Another
possible reason that we are going to look into is, as implicated by the transaction cost theory
discussed in Chapter 2, the collection of user charges may incur lower transaction costs.
Heavy Reliance on Local Services
Needless to say, the proceeding of a real estate development relies intensively on local
public service provision, including land acquisition, water, electricity, and gas conveyance,
garbage collection, and other services. They are provided either by the government or SOEs.
By virtue of their familiarity with the local economy and because of their other regulatory
responsibilities, local governments have the best chance to identify related subjects to set up a
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collection of user fees. However, looking through the taxes related to real estate, none of them
address compensation for the costs of urban public services provided by the local government.
This pushes the localities to charge user fees.
On the other hand, a project needs to be approved by different local government
departments and is under their supervision. It has to follow local zoning, obtain planning,
design, and construction permissions, and meet other regulations. The project will fail if
anyone of these services or resources is suspended, or the developer fails to obtain any of the
building permits from the government. Therefore, it is easy for localities to step in, take public
service as one of the revenue instruments to charge users fees throughout the development
process.
Highly Retained User Charge Revenue at the Local Level
Another important incentive to levy user fees is because most of these charges go to local
revenues without sharing with the central government. Local governments have much more
freedom in making expenditures in the extrabudgetary accounts than in the budgetary accounts.
The user charges are tolerated by the central government because sometimes it is convenient for
the controlling unit not to challenge the independent actions of the lower-level governments;
sometimes the control mechanism is not in place; or sometimes there is an ambiguity in the law
that permits local discretion (Bahl, 1994).
Besides, the booming market and soaring housing prices indicate high demand of real estate
products in some Chinese cities. The incremental of housing price may not hurt much the
50
consumption in the market due to the strong demand. Thus it allows developers to transfer the
user charge levies to consumers, offsetting their charges by increasing housing prices.
3.2.2 Current Condition of Real Estate User Charges in Housing
development in major Chinese Cities
In the off-budget finance system in China today, land leasing fee is the largest sum. It is
based on the state-owned land policy, which is not the focus of this thesis. What we are going
to stress here is all other user fees. The number of fees is much larger than that of taxes. They
take up a large share of the total real estate project costs, and they are imposed in all stages of
development.
Types of User Fees
There are three types of user fee charged in housing development, Revenue of
Administrative Units and Institutions14, Government Funds' 5 , and Fees for Management and
16Service
The first type of use fee is imposed by government administrative units and institutions.
They are mainly charges for infrastructures and public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity;
charges for urban public services, such as relocation of original residents, green space
compensation, and the like. As the data shown in the previous discussion, the sharing of
4 Xing zheng shi ye xing shou fei
" Zheng fu ji jin
16 Guan li fu wu fei
Revenue of Administrative Units and Institutions is about 70 percent of the total extrabudgetary
funds. In the real estate sector, it is consistent with the general situation that the charges of
administrative units and institutions account for the largest sharing of the total user fee revenue.
In Shanghai in 2003, it counts for 81.33 percent of the total. In this case, part of the expense on
the access and connection to the urban utility system paid to the SOEs was included in the land
cost, otherwise the percentage will rise to 88.78 percent (Fig. 3-3).
0 81.33%
07.92%
E 10.75% * Revenue of Administrative Units and Insttution
* Government Funds
0 Fees for Management and Service
Fig. 3-3: Sharing of 3 Types of User Fees in a Housing Development Case in Shanghai
Source: calculated from data obtained in interviews
The second type is Government Funds raised for some earmarked usages. The specific
purposes can be related to real estate, or it can be cross-sector subsidy for other industry. For
example, the government charges fees to support the research on new building materials, or to
subsidize national irrigation projects. Government Funds may vary a great deal from city to
city comparing to the other two types of fees, depending on the related funds raised by local
government for particular purposes. The wall materialfund and bulk cementfund are two
common items charged.
The third type is Fees for Management and Service are charged to cover most of the
administrative cost of government institutions. They include fees for the approval of
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construction drawings, or fees for approval of building qualities, and the like. They are directly
related to the one time payment to the officials who offer the service or involve housing
development supervision and management. Besides these charges, there is no other funding
that covers the administrative costs of the government to provide technical supports for real
estate development.
Approval Procedures for User fees
According to the Revenue of Administrative Units and Institutions Approval and
Management Rule' 7 implemented on January 1st 2005, the levies should be approved either at
the central or at the provincial level. At the central level, the central departments should submit
their proposal to the Ministry of Finance and National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC). After their reviews, the proposal needs to be approved by the State Council. At the
provincial level, all the departments or institutions under the provincial jurisdiction should hand
in their proposal to the provincial financial department and the Pricing Bureau, and have the
provincial government approve it.
The government funds and management and service fees should be approved by central,
provincial or municipal financial department and Pricing Bureau respectively, according to the
jurisdiction where the levy is implemented. All user fees should be consistent with the Law of
Administrative Permission18 implemented on July 1 2004.
17 Ministry of Finance,NDRC,Xing zheng shi ye xing shou fei xiang mu shen pi guan 1i zan xing ban fa, 12/30/2005
18 Xing zheng xu ke fa
Government departments involved in fees charges are Sanitation Bureau, Environmental
Protection Department, Education Bureau, Police Bureau, City Planning Bureau, Construction
Bureau, Building management Bureau, Labor Force Bureau, Green Space Office, Commercial
and Business Bureau. Each of these departments that want to launch a new charge needs to
propose to relative financial department and the Pricing Bureau. Most of the fees they collect
will be deposited into the specific extrabudgetary account of the government. They can get
refund from the local government according to their extrabudgetary expenditures for the coming
year. By this means, the consolidated extrabudgetary funds are controlled by the local
government and redistribute to the subsidiary departments according to their needs. This helps
the cross-sector subsidy and makes the funding distribution more efficiently.
Trends of Users Fees Policy in Recent Years
Although local governments levy user fees as an alternative revenue source, the central
government shows some efforts to reduce the user fees types and to regulate the levies. Early in
1996, the central government eliminated 48 items of fees. According to this regulation, Beijing
actually eliminated 36 items in 1997 and imposed new regulations 5 times since then for
reducing user charges. In April 2001, the NDRC and Ministry of Finance launched another
national wide regulation, which eliminated 47 items of fees charged by administrative
institutions. Those items included building development management fee, project construction
auditing fee, property transition management fee, and the like19 . It involved all of the
19 Fees eliminated: Building development management fee, Building leasing management fee, urban construction
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development procedures as entitlement, land acquisition, planning, construction, sales, and
occupancy. Those fees were eliminated because they were either illegal, or did not work well
with the current institutional settings or market situation. Further more, it required the localities
to eliminate similar items to these 47 levies and should not increase the existing charges. This
regulation also decreased 6 items by 30 percent. They were land acquisition management fee,
20
relocation management fee, and so on . Encouraged by the central government, some
provincial or municipal governments even reduce more similar items.
The regulation had reduced the development cost to varied degrees in different cities. For
example, Shenzhen only levied 1 out of the 47 items before the regulation, so it was not affected
by the new legislation. Vanke Co. Ltd estimated the impact on development cost per square
meter in several cities. It was 21.13 yuan in Shenyang, 16 yuan in Beijing, 4-13 yuan in
Shanghai, 10 yuan in Shenzhen, 9 yuan in Chengdu and only 3.2 yuan in Tianjin2 1 . Comparing
to the total development cost that is usually several thousand yuan per square meter in these
cities, the impact of this fees elimination was less than 1 percent of the total.
Overall, this policy did not reduce monetary fees much, because most of the eliminations
and relieves were very trivial items. They did not account for the significant component of the
total levies. In fact, the large components, such as infrastructure and energy resource provision,
were not even touched.
However, the elimination had some indirect and non-monetary impacts. It had positive
archive binding fee, etc.
20 Others are Construction quality supervision fee, Labor contract certificate fee, Construction contract certificate
fee, architectural contract certificate fee.
21 Man Xu, Beijing Youth, 4/19/2004
influence on the real estate market, implying the orientation of government policy towards a
well-regulated transparent system. The elimination of a trivial charge might lead to the
abolishment of a government management office, which helped compress the institutional
structure. These policies also reflected the government's willingness to improve and encourage
real estate development.
Another trend of policy is the sustainability considerations. Although it just started
recently and is only shown in big cities, it is meaningful for the sustainable development of
Chinese cities. For example, most of the cities charge fees to encourage bulk cement use to
protect trees by reducing produce of cement paper bags. They also charge new wall material
fees to enhance the use of environmental friendly and energy-saving materials. Beijing and
Shanghai are two pioneers of this trend. Beijing announced to launch a new charge for dirt
winnowing to reduce the air pollution in May, 2006. Shanghai and Beijing charge user fees for
trashing wastes and polluted water. Although this trend is not very strong and has not been
popular across the country, it is a positive sign of the Chinese government being aware of
sustainable urban growth.
Fees Standard
Fees standards vary in different cities. As Bahl and Linn (1992) point out, one of the
reasons led to fees differentiation is location differences, due to the city size, economic
development, input price, proximity to resources, geological conditions, measure method, and
policy orientation. Usually, cities with bigger sizes and faster growth pace imply higher costs.
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For example, from the data collected from the interviews we got that, for the similar villa
projects, the project approval fee in Shanghai is about 100 yuan per square meter. However,
Hangzhou, which is the capital of Jiangsu Province and is several hundred kilometers away from
Shanghai, has this fee about only 60 yuan per square meter. The provisions of water, gas, cable
TV and telecommunication are more expensive in Shangahi than in Hangzhou.
Some fees are more rigid, or are only applied in big cities. For example, Shanghai charged
fees for sewage water drainage because it is the leading city paying attention to the urban
environmental issue. One reason is that in big cities the institutional settings are more
accomplished, so it is smoother for them to catch new regulations. The second reason may be
because the governments in big cities are more far-sighted. They realize in the long run, by
launching regulations will it encourage real estate investment and ultimately grow the market.
However, big cities are not always the best. Except for villa projects, Shanghai charges
electricity provision of all other real estate development with a uniform price. This is not fair
because different projects have different requirements based on their own situations, using
various pipe lines or other equipments and labor force. Costs of electricity connection and
conveyance also vary among projects. In Hanzhou, the city charges electricity connection
according to the actual cost of the construction work. And the overall price is less expensive in
Hanzhou than in Shanghai, as we mentioned before.
Fees Deduction or In-kind Exaction
The affordable housing is the major type of housing development that has fee and tax
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deductions, because they are subsidized by the government to lower their costs so that they can
provide housing at below-market prices for poor people. They are subsidized through the
reduction in land leasing fees, which is the biggest component of the total cost. Beside, they
have 50 percent fee deduction in some items, such as relocation management fee 2 .
The general housing development also has fee deduction. There are three situations.
First, according to the government regulation, the developer can waive the payment of some
items, such as education surcharge, by building a school within the site and then transfer it to the
government to maintain after completion. A similar regulation also applies to some other
public buildings, such as hospital. Most of the deductions are the second type. This is more
like a substitution or an in-kind exaction based on negotiation between the government and
developer. In these cases, the developer can get a fee deduction by contributing to urban
services. For example, they may preserve part of the site as an urban green space and open the
access to the public; or they may build a public road next to the site; or they may install street
lights or plant street trees. By doing this, the developer can negotiate with the local government
to have some fees deducted or pay lower land leasing fees. Of course, the deduction is usually
more than enough to cover their contribution, so the developer gets indirect user fee deduction.
This kind of deduction is mostly decided by negotiation, because there is no regulation to address
which items are deductible, or how to evaluate whether or not the contribution matches the
deduction. Thirdly, developers sometimes sacrifice a small piece of land to build a park or
22 The "Affordable Housing Management Regulation" published by the Ministry of Construction in 2004
announced the 50 percent deduction of fees, but did not list the items. In practice, the deduction items vary from city
to city, so the amounts deducted are not clear, either.
green space open to the public. By doing this, they may change or partially change the attribute
of their property, for example, from commercial to some public use, so as to win back
preferential tax or user charge relief.
The developer and local government will have an agreement on the fee deductions because
usually the deducted items are those whose revenue belongs to higher levels of government. So
the lower level government has the developer to contribute to the local urban service, which
saves local expenditure. On the developer side, they also save development costs by paying
less to build public facilities using the deducted fees. However, from the interviews, we got to
know that because all these deductions are based on negotiation and personal connections with
localities, it is not transparent and varies significantly, in a range from 0 to 100 percent.
Government Administration and Inter-government Conflicts
In the urban area, government administration in China has five levels: (1) central; (2)
provincial, with 28 provinces, 4 cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing, which have
provincial status; (3) Municipal; (4) City District (5) township, including townships and towns
(Fig.3-4). Each level of government in the system is controlled by the next-higher level, and
with relative freedom, each unit may control the activities of its subordinate unit. This control
includes shaping the tax-sharing arrangements, determining grant distributions, and defining the
split in expenditure responsibility between each higher and lower level of government (Bahl,
1999). The provision of gas, electricity and water that needs coordination with larger area is
usually controlled by the city. The smaller and more local services like street lights, trees, and
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pavement are managed at the district level. The district is responsible to collect user charges
from all the real estate development constructed under its jurisdiction, including the fees for the
Central Government
22 Provinces & 5 Autonomous Regions 4 Municipalities*
Prefectures and Municipalities
City Districts Urban Counties
Towns Townships
* Includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing municipalities.
Note: Does not include Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
Fig. 3-4 Government Structure in Urban Area in China (Reference: Bahl, 1999)
services controlled by the city, which will be handed in to the city later on. In this situation, the
district government and the city government act as the agency and the principal respectively.
The city government has to spend cost to ensure the district to work effectively for fees
collection.
Since late 1980s, with the further implementation of the Opening Policy, many cities started
to create "Development Zones" under their jurisdiction. These development zones are planned
following urban agglomeration strategy. They aim to concentrate similar companies within the
zone, focusing on different industries. The development zones also receive relatively favorable
finance policies. Zones such as economic development zone and high technology development
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zone are very popular in major Chinese cities. Geographically, these development zones are
usually small and physically within the boundary of city districts. As a new institution, the
development zone government is not included in the usual administrative government system.
Actually it is at the same administrative level as the district but involves more economic
Development Zone Development Zone
City District
City District
Fig. 3-5: The Geographical Relationship Fig. 3-6: The Administrative Power of
of City Zone and Development Zone City Zone and Development Zone
activities. Fig. 3-5 and Fig. 3-6 demonstrate the geographical and administrative relationship
between these two governments. A project in the development zone is geographically also in
the district. So it is controlled by both governments. In the cities where the zone and the
district are not well coordinated, they do not allocate the responsibilities and revenues properly.
The developer faces the awkward situation that the project is double monitored by two same
level governments. In this way, conflicted policies or duplicated user charges can not be
avoided.
Monitoring Institutions
Among the institutional settings of real estate user charge system, the neglect of monitoring
institutions is critical. There are no any institutions to monitor the user charge system in the
aspects of pricing, implementation, enforcement. The government and the developer
communicate through negotiations, which is very subjective and heavily depends on the
connections in between. It also leads to sever social problems such as official corruption
without inspection.
Although there are some means developers may appeal their requirements or complaints
currently, their effect is limited. For example, each department of the government publishes
email address or mail box to the public, and the mayors also schedule open hours to meet with
visitors. These means do not really work effectively because most developers would not
oppose the government directly even if they complain behind; voices of individual developers do
not invoke much attention; and their advices may not really be taken by the government either.
Summary
Overall, the real estate user charges have been changing in a favorable direction, especially
in big cities. The government continues to make efforts to alleviate user fee burdens for
developers. However, problems are obvious within this system. Ambiguous legislation and
uncompleted regulations can not guide different performances in user charge practices effectively.
The system needs improvements in efficiency and transparency urgently.
Chapter 4
Evaluation of User Charge Practices in Major Chinese
Cities
The evaluation for the policy structure of user charge practices in terms of efficiency and
equity in the Chinese real estate market is complicated. In this chapter, we have three sections
trying to evaluate this system. First it is an overall discussion on user fees levied in housing
development, using the transaction cost analysis as main framework. Second we talk about the
efficiency and equity evaluation of user charge practices in major Chinese cities. In the last
section, we bring in a particular case, the infrastructure and support service fee in Shanghai, to
discuss some problems in details.
4.1 Transaction Cost Analysis of User Charges
User charge types are different in Chinese cities. Table 4-1 shows the user charges levied
in housing development in Shanghai. Our data is obtained from a particular villa project with
total investment over 600,000,000 yuan (US$ 75,000,000).23 Thefees standard column shows
the unit price of each charge. Since these fees are calculated according to different base, we
provide the price by floor area column that averages the fee payment according to the total
building floor area (including underground), so that we have a uniform base to look at the
23 Some fees standards vary according to building type or total building floor area.
63
impacts of fees in terms of value per square meter.
Table 4-1 Real Estate User Charges in Housing Development in Shanghai
Item Fees standard Price by Charging
floor area* organization
1 Land reclamation fee 10000 yuan/mu** n/a*** Housing and Land
Bureau
2 Vegetarian field fund 18000-3000 yuan/mu n/a Housing and Land
Bureau
3 Land compensation fee 5200 yuan/mu for grain field, n/a Housing and Land
8800 yuan/mu for vegetarian Bureau
field or higher
4 Seeding compensation 900 yuan/mu for grain field, 1600 n/a Housing and Land
fee yuan/mu for vegetarian field or Bureau
higher
5 Ground/underground according to National n/a Housing and Land
structure compensation Construction Land Acquisition Bureau
Financial Compensation Standard
6 Land acquisition 2% of total of the land acquisition n/a Housing and Land
management fee fees Bureau
7 Land acquisition 2% of total of the land acquisition n/a Housing and Land
non-predictable fee fees Bureau
8 Land acquisition labor various n/a Labor Bureau
force relocation
compensation fee
9 Land acquisition senior according to contract n/a Senior organizations
relocation compensation
10 Land acquisition peasant 1.4% of total labor force n/a Labor Bureau
relocation compensation compensation
11 Land acquisition 1.4% of total labor force n/a Labor Bureau
relocation compensation
non-predictable fee
12 Land acquisition forest according to the related n/a Forest Bureau
occupancy compensation regulation
13 Property initial 0.02-0.2% of total property value n/a Property Registration
registration fee Office
14 Green field deposit 50 yuan/m 2  n/a Urban Management
Bureau
15 Building demolition 300.00 yuan/unit; 0.2%--0.5% of n/a Housing and Land
management fee total relocation compensation fee Bureau
16 Site boundary 326.00 yuan/point n/a Reconnaissance Center
reconnaissance fee
17 Infrastructures & 320.00 yuan/m 2  320.00 Housing Bureau
support service fee yuan/m 2
18 Property reconnaissance 0.60-0.80 yuan/m 2  n/a**** Reconnaissance Center
fee
19 Maps 65.00-120.00 yuan each n/a Real Estate Archive
Bureau
20 People's defense 60.00 yuan/m2 60.00 yuan/m2 People's Defense
construction fee Office
21 Bulk cement fund 4 yuan/ton 0.19 yuan/m2 Planning and
Development
Commission
22 Wall materials fund solid brick 0. lyuan/piece,air 3.81 yuan/m2 Planning and
(Clay brick) brick 0.025yuan/piece Development
Commission
23 Quality supervision fee 0.1% of construction bidding 0.24 yuan/m 2  Financial Bureau
price
24 Planning permission 0.1% of estimated construction 0.76 yuan/m2 Planning Bureau
license fee cost if is below 90 million, or
plus 0.05% of the beyond part
25 Planning permission 50% of license fee 0.38 yuan/m2 Planning Bureau
license application fee
26 Construction permit fee 0.1% of total estimated 0.09 yuan/m 2  Construction
construction cost Commission
27 Supervision transaction 0.28% of the supervision fee 0.02 yuan/m 2  Supervision agency
fee
228 Design bidding agency 0.018% of estimated total cost 0.48 yuan/m2 Bidding agency
fee (except land lease fee)
29 Construction bidding 0.06% of estimated construction 0.32 yuan/m 2  Bidding agency
agency fee cost
30 Construction supervision 0.06% of estimated construction n/a Bidding agency
bidding agency fee cost
31 Completion archiving fee 0.6% of estimated construction 0.46 yuan/m 2  Planning Bureau
cost
32 Construction wastes 0.50 yuan-2.00yuan/ton n/a Urban Management
deposition fee Bureau
33 Water pipe fee 17.50 yuan/m2 17.50 yuan/m2 Municipal Waterworks
Note: * calculated by dividing the fees value is divided
** lmu=667m2
by building floor area.
*** the price by floor area is not able to be calculated for item 1-16 because in this project, they were
included in the land auction with the land lease fee.
**** item 18,19,30,32 are not applicable to this project.
Source: data converted from interviews
4.1.1 General Description of User Fees in Table 4-1
User fees in table 4-1 are charged in different phases of the housing development. Item
1-17 are usually charged during the land acquisition, mainly to compensate the relocation
population and the agricultural loss. They are mostly the first type of fees, the revenue of
administrative units and institutions as we define in Chapter 3. As all the land in China has to
be auctioned publicly before it is leased up, particularly, item 1-16 are often included in the
34 Fee for loss in water 1.58 yuan/m2 1.58 yuan/m2 Municipal Waterworks
connection
35 Outdoor fire pipe 6.00 yuan/m2  6.00 yuan/m 2  Municipal Waterworks
36 Miscellaneous costs n/a 3.00 yuan/m 2  Municipal Waterworks
37 Water pump 400,000 yuan each 3.28 yuan/m 2  Municipal Waterworks
38 Sewage pipe 80.00 yuan/m 2  80.00 yuan/m 2  Municipal Waterworks
39 Waste water drainage 17.00 yuan/m 2  17.00 yuan/m 2  District Drainage
fee Management Office
40 Waste water pump 600,000 yuan each 4.91 yuan/m2 District Drainage
Management Office
41 High/low voltage 303.00 yuan/m 2  303.00 Municipal Electric
equipment and yuan/m 2  Power Company
installation
42 Outdoor gas pipe 24.5.00 yuan/m 2  24.5.00 Municipal Pipeline
networks yuan/m2 Gas Network
I_ Company
43 Telephone line 28.00 yuan/m 2  28.00 yuan/m 2  Municipal Telecom
Co. Ltd
44 TV cable 22.00 yuan/m 2  22.00 yuan/m 2  Municipal Cable
Company
auction price in land auctions2. Therefore their single price may not be applicable. The item
17 of infrastructures & support service fee is a single fee charged for infrastructures and public
services such as public roads, public utilities, and schools. Even though every Chinese city
levies this fee, the services included in it are more or less different.
Item 18-32 are charged in development prophase. After land acquisition, the developer
needs to prepare the architectural design and construction drawings, and apply a series of
planning and construction permissions and licenses. They should pay license fees, application
fees, agency fees, and some government funds at this stage. These fees are mostly the second
and third types we define in Chapter 3, the government fund and fees for management and
service.
Item 33-44 are utility fees (including telephone and TV cable). The public utilities are
included in the item 17 of infrastructures & support service fee. By paying item 17, local
governments provide different levels of public utility installations in different cities. Some
finish all the work, some only offer utility connections to the site but leave the pipeline networks
within the site, and some have a situation in between. From the studied project, we found that it
spent item 33-44 to finish the rest of utility installations that were not covered by the
infrastructure & support service fee. Other than the rest of the fees, instead of paying to
government departments or agencies, these fees are paid directly to providers which are normally
state-owned enterprises.
14 In the past, auction was not mandatory. Most land use rights were assigned to users through negotiated
contracts.
4.1.2 Transaction costs analysis
Transaction cost analysis is an effective method to examine the efficiency of a system from
one angle. It is meaningful for us to be aware of the different types of transaction costs related
to housing development and to reduce them in the future policy making.
Cost of Identifying the Transacting! Parties
One of the points in the literature review is, when the individuals who consume the services
are easily defined, the user charge is the most efficient means because of the low transaction
costs of identifying transacting parties. So user charges are suitable for the services such as
water supply, sewerage, power, and telephone (Bahl and Linn, 1992).
In housing development in China, some of the services are easy to define their transacting
parties as Bahl and Linn think, for instance, the service and management fee called planning
permission license application fee. It is a fee paid to the officers in the Planning Bureau for
checking architectural design and construction drawing documents of the projects, and other
requirements. For this fee, the government units and agencies provide service and assistance to
facilitate the development, and the developer is the direct beneficiary. They are easily defined
as the transacting party in the development.
But in some cities where we conducted our interviews, developers were charged
government funds such as irrigation fund raised for regional irrigation work. Developers
complained about this fee because they did not benefit from it. Even if this charge would be
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transferred to future customers, it was not fair to only charge new home buyers because all the
residents in this area would use the irrigation work. The transaction costs may be high to
accurately define the transacting parties to whom the service is delivered.
Sometimes it is the identification of the provider in a transaction that is problematic. In
the infrastructures & support service fee, a proportion of the charge goes to public utility
provisions. Developers pay the fee to the government, but the actual providers are the State
Owned Enterprise such as municipal Pipeline Gas Network Company (table 4-1). Therefore
there may be high transaction costs to identify the providers in this situation. We will talk about
this problem in detail when we discuss the case of infrastructures & support servicefee in the
third section.
Cost of Pricing the Service
As the literatures suggest, the price of service is decided by the marginal cost of providing
the service with appropriate amendments. When the market is efficient, the price is decided by
supply and demand. For the fees charged for public utilities and governmental advisory
services, they mostly have earmarked usages, which is to finance the same services they are
collected from. The marginal cost is decided by the material, labor, time invested in providing
each unit of the service. For example, the completion archiving fee should be priced as the time
and material costs of making archive for the project. The direct transactions without interims
should not incur much cost.
Yet in Chinese real estate development, the cost of fair pricing may not be low to some of
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fees for several reasons. First, some of the services are involved in State Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) as providers, especially in utility provisions. The SOEs are mostly monopolies in the
market, meaning that they may be arbitrary in their pricing. The marginal cost is not easy to be
observed because there are no market competitors. We will talk about the details of the SOE
issues in the third section later in this chapter.
Second, some services such as education is hard to price. A highly educated people can
contribute a great deal to the society, but is hard to quantify these benefits. This makes it
difficult to price this service by estimating the social benefits of education. Services such as
public roads are not easy to observe the actual users, so the marginal pricing is not simple to
calculate too.
Besides, comparing to the rapid economic development, China has not been able to make
progress simultaneously in other aspects. Therefore very few amendments such as income
redistribution are considered in the user charge pricing. Though environmental issues start to
be aware of in recent years, instead of adjusting the marginal price of some user fees, Chinese
government began to levy single user charges such as the bulk cementfee and waste water
drainagefee to encourage environmental protection. However, these fees cannot be adjusted
based on any marginal cost calculations.
The pricing rule of urban services do not seem to be accurately applied, nevertheless the
approval of the user charge price has to go through certain procedures and pass the scrutiny of
Pricing Bureaus. It is going to be a gradual process, and corresponding costs will incur to
correct the inaccuracy in pricing.
Cost of Negotiation
The local government maintains some flexibility in policy interpretation. Sometimes the
local government gives favorable policy to attract big investors because they contribute greatly
to local economic growth. The government would charge less for important projects because
they have significant impacts on the city. The policy flexibility allows negotiations going on
between the government and the developer in the user charge implementation in housing
development.
Many negotiations are about fee deduction. The user charge deduction probably is the
most ambiguous and least transparent point in the system. There are few regulations addressing
fees deduction clearly. Even those deduction clauses do not well define the criteria to obtain
deduction, or the related deduction rate. Therefore, certain amount of user charge deductions is
decided by negotiations. For instance, The Rule of Shanghai People's Defense Construction
and Usage Management 25 claims that the people's defense construction fee is 50 percent
deductible in several situations such as government subsidized rent housing, kindergarten, school
building, etc. But the last type of deductible is "other civic buildings authorized deduction by
the municipal government". It provides neither the explanation of the authorization criteria nor,
the deduction rate. It may apply to those important or specific projects, and will involve
negotiation costs to the developer and the government for achieving consensus on what can be
deducted, and what the deduction rate should be.
25 Shanghai shi min fang gong cheng jian she he shi yong guan 1i ban fa
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Developers also negotiate with the government about the due date of large amount of
payment such as fees for infrastructure. For some projects, developers sometimes borrow loans
from banks. They would negotiate with the government to postpone their payment in order to
save interest cost.
Real estate developers negotiate with SOEs for public utility provisions as well. Without
other options of service providers, the developer has to negotiate with SOEs to acquire possibly
lower price.
Mainly due to the unclear regulations and legal clauses, negotiations in user charge
practices involve high costs of time, money and human capital.
Government Cost
As an off-budget practice, user charges occupy a gray area in public finance. They are
imposed by local governments and agencies, possibly without explicit guidelines from the top, so
the implementation of many fees is likely to be questioned. These issues widely occur in
transitional economies like China, where the government is undergoing rapid changes.
Accordingly government cost rises due to governance limitations at the current stage.
Back to years ago, the legal status of user charges was much worse. Most likely any level
of agencies and governments at that time could levy user charges without going through an
approval process because there lacked user charge regulations. Even if the central government
has made an effort to legalize user charges in recent years, as of today, the user charge legislation
in China is still incomplete and contains a lot of ambiguity. The central government may not be
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spending much cost to set up legislation because it somehow tolerates the ambiguities of
regulations and keep some grey areas in the laws. The reason may be because it could be
convenient for the controlling unit not to challenge the independent actions of the lower levels of
government. In other situations, it may be simply because the control mechanism is not in
place. For the lower levels of government, they may want to keep the flexibility of policy
interpretation so that they have more discretions over the user fee collection.
Government costs occur when inter-governmental interest conflicts between higher and
lower levels of government, such as the city and the district, and between the same level of
governments such as the development zone and the district, as described in Chapter 3, need
mediation. For example, the Waste water drainage fee is collected by the district drainage
management office, and is handed in to a national account afterwards. The central government
may need to motivate the district drainage management office through municipal government,
ensuring that they are collecting this fee effectively. This kind of problems arises because the
government administrative system has not entirely reformed to catch up with the rapid economic
development that requires a lot of inter-governmental cooperation and coordination.
Government costs are paying to deal with the interest conflicts, revenue shares, and clarification
of each level of government's responsibilities and powers.
Though currently the government cost is not necessarily high especially in legislation
enhancement. As a well regulated and completed system is desired in future reforms, all these
challenges will involve considerable government costs.
Enhancement Cost
Seemingly the procedure of the user fee collection leads to a high compliance rate because
the charges are paralleled along the entire development process chronologically. The developer
has to pay fees before they receive the service and move the development forward. If they
refuse to pay any fee at any stage, the related service will be shut down and the development has
to be suspended. So currently it seems not much cost is paid to enforce fee collection.
However, if we think it over, there are problems. The government sends officers to
collect each user fee. Among large numbers of fees, some are very big, like the infrastructures
& support service fee (320 yuan/m 2); some are really small, like the construction permitfee (0.09
yuan/m 2 ). The actual costs of collecting each of these fees should not have too much difference.
To big fees, the cost of collection is very trivial comparing to its revenue. But to the small fees,
the cost of setting up an officer to manage the payment may be even larger than the revenue
received. In this sense, the enforcement costs for these fees are really high despite the actual
value.
Another truth is, due to a lot of negotiations without explicit policy guidance, decisions
may not be made appropriately. So even though a considerate amount of revenue is collected
every year, there may be some mistaken and omitted collection, or over charged items. This is
especially severe in in-kind exactions. For example, if the government has the developer to
build a local road using the people's defense construction fees, then this fee will be collected
insufficiently and the funds for people's defense construction will be reduced to below the
required level. Therefore, enforcement costs will be paid not only to ensure the total revenue of
user charge, but also to correct all the distortions and errors in fees collection in the development.
4.2 Efficiency and Equity Evaluations of User Charges in Chinese
Housing Development
Efficiency and equity are the two objectives of urban public finance policy. Based on the
analysis of transaction costs for user fees, we attempt to evaluate the efficiency of the user charge
practices in Chinese housing development. The equity considerations are just initiated at early
stage in China, and not much has been achieved yet by user charges. So we will look at the
potential contributions that user charges may make in improving urban equity in this section.
4.2.1 Efficiency and Equity Objectives in Urban Public Finance Policy
The efficiency objective of public finance policy is to maximize the annual total net
production value, or the present value of the net production output. For this study, it is to
maximize the aggregated value in urban public services. Efficiency maximizes the size of the
overall pie of urban services such as infrastructure, school, healthcare, etc. All resources are
used most effectively to maximize the value of the output, the least waste of resources, and
simultaneously the greatest growth in overall production.
The equity objective of public finance policy is to equalize or distribute in a fair way the
burden of supporting the common public service expenditures. However, what is "fair" is a
somewhat subjective question that has to be decided by the city or the region through the
political and social/cultural process. In general, the idea is that lower income groups that are
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less able to afford to pay for the urban services should not have to pay as much costs, while
higher income groups that can more easily afford to pay should pay more to support the public
goods. Equity is to maximize the proportion of the society that can enjoy the public services.
It is important to note that the two objectives of efficiency and equity are not always or
necessarily in conflict with one another. There may be some policies that may promote both
objectives at once. And there may be some that are harmful to both objectives. However,
many policies tend to involve some trade-off between the two objectives.
4.2.2 Efficiency Evaluations of the User Charge
As Bahl and Linn (1992) point out, user charge has advantage to help allocate urban
resources efficiently because of its earmarked usages. It is an important contribution for China
as a country with large population and scarce resources. Yet the efficiency of user charge
system is limited by involving several types of high transaction costs. We also notice that the
transaction costs are offset by the relatively high investment return, therefore the inefficiency is
tolerated by all involved parties due to the booming market today. But for the long run,
improvements in efficiency should be the major target of user charge reforms when the market
matures.
Efficiency Contribution of User Charges
As an earmarked financial instrument, the user charge based on cost-benefit evaluation in
theory enhances efficient resources allocation. This is even more critical for China since the
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resource there is very precious due to its large population and high density in urban areas. It is
important for the government striving to improve the efficiency in urban resource allocation by
launching appropriate finance policies, so that the limited resources can benefit urban population
to the greatest extent.
In China, many real estate projects are related to residential development. In 2005, the
total real estate capital invested in Beijing was 152.5 billion yuan (US$19 billion). Among
these investments, 77.9 billion yuan (US$1 billion) was spent in housing development, which
was much more than 19.6 billion yuan (US$2.4 billion) for office buildings and 11.3 billion yuan
(US$ 1.4 billion) for commercial buildings2 6. Residential development requires huge
consumption of gas, water, electricity, and related equipment installation. By charging user fees,
it results in more efficient usage of natural resources and avoiding excessive consumption or
waste of resources. Developers would prefer effective technical networks and equipment layout
when appropriate charges are imposed.
When the market works efficiently, which means the provision of services is decided by the
supply and demand in the market, the user charge can be taken as a guide for real estate
investment because the user charge is levied on those who directly receive the benefits from
services, reflecting the willingness of people to pay for the services. Nevertheless the housing
market in China is still developing and is not very efficient, the user charge more or less acts as
an indicator implying the characteristics of target customers.
26 Beijing Statistical Information Net, http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/zwxx/tpbd/ 2 00602 2
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Limitation of the Efficiency of User Charges
As of today, the efficiency of user charges is limited to some extent without completed
legislation and advanced institutional settings. Negotiation and enforcement costs occur as a
result of the ambiguity of regulations. A large number of user fees engage enforcement costs of
collecting and paying fees, and therefore leads to efficiency loss. The limitation of SOEs as a
public service provider circumscribes fair market pricing, as have been discussed earlier. The
intergovernmental conflicts cause government inefficiency too.
Currently the inefficiency of user charges is largely tolerated by the government and the
developer. The high consumer demand in the real estate market is bringing high return to
housing development, which may outweigh the transaction costs. But for the long run, the
inefficiency will hurt future market growth and may slow down its expansion. For long term
consideration, the Chinese government should be dedicated to reforming institutional settings
related to real estate user charges and establishing a set of use charge regulations. This will, of
course, engage in high government costs in the short term. A lot of enforcement costs will be
engaged too because it is important to make sure all the new regulations are well implemented.
But after the government has we built up a completed set of regulations and accomplished
institutional reforms, the transaction costs may be reduced. The development of market
functions will help fair pricing; the government will only need to maintain the system and make
small changes according to market demand. The enforcement and negotiation costs will be low
after fee distortions are corrected. And eventually, the market may become more efficient.
4.2.3 Equity Evaluations of the User Charge
In the equity considerations, we assume that a social welfare function in which an additional
unit of income in the hands of the poor is valued more than an additional unit in the hands of the
rich (Bahl and Linn, 1992). Since 1979, China has carried a series of economic reforms,
resulting in rapid regional development and significant social wealth creation. However,
income inequality in urban China began widening in the mid-1980s, coinciding with the early
stage of urban economic reforms. Inequality has become even more dramatic after 1992 than
before. In 2002, the richest five percent earned 15 percent of the total residents' income; while
the richest 10 percent earned 25 percent. By contrast, the poorest five percent earned 1.2
percent of the total, while the poorest 10 percent made less than 3 percent. This means that the
income of the richest five percent of urban residents was nearly 13 times that of the poorest five
percent (China Development Research Foundation, 2005).
Facing such a large population of the poor, how to create more opportunities for them to
have urban public services? How to enhance those services consumed more intensely by the
poor rather than the rich? Or how to provide poor people services with lower payment? The
structure and level of user charges may determine the extent to which low-income people make
use of services such as water, sewers, electricity, which is the contribution to urban equity.
Cross-sector Subsidy
Service users with a relatively high income-elasticity but a low price-elasticity should
cross-subsidize users of a service with a relatively low income-elasticity but a high
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price-elasticity, or if a large target surplus is postulated, at least the former group should be made
to contribute a greater share to the financial surplus than the latter (Bahl and Linn, 1992). With
the income increasing, the demand for high income-elastic services will decrease to a great
extent; while the demand for low income-elastic services will not change much. So the low
income people barely enjoy the high income income-elastic services; they consume more of the
low income-elastic ones. Similarly, to a high price-elastic service, when the price goes up, the
number of consumer will reduce a lot; while a low price-elastic service will not be influenced
much. Therefore, the low income-elastic and high price-elastic services are those usually
important for daily life and are consumed intensively by the poor, such as primary education, or
public utility. Encouraging the development of these services is helpful to benefit poor people
and improve urban equity.
As we know, Chinese government has an integrated account for fee collections, and
redistributes to each government department according to their independent budget proposal.
Cross-sector subsidies are relatively easy to conduct and therefore are very common along this
course. Fund redistribution are coordinated and transferred from one sector to another.
However, it is not clear that between which sectors these transfers happen and in which direction
funds are transferred. Following Bahl and Linn's point, if subsidies are made from high
income-elastic and low price-elastic services such as building a classy high school taught by
native English teachers, to low income-elastic and high price-elastic services such as normal
primary schools and hospitals, then the government is able to provide more services that the
lower income people consumes intensively, which helps balance the inequity of urban growth.
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Fee Deduction for In-kind Contributions to Public Goods
As we described in Chapter 3, there are some fee deduction rules in some cities. If a
developer contributes to public goods such as building a primary school, or a small park, they
may get an overall fees rate deduction. If being well defined, this rule can be a very effective
tool to enhance urban equity. That is, if the deduction rule is set towards encouraging the
accomplishment of public goods with low income-elasticity and high price-elasticity, then as we
analyzed before, we actually encourage the services consumed heavily by poor people. By this
means, it contributes to have more services get built to benefit the low income group and
increase their welfare.
However, as a matter of fact, this rule is not designed delicately for the real estate user
charges. As we know, most likely the developer and the government achieve these fees
deductions by negotiation. There are no details of the rule addressing elements such as the type
of in-kind contribution and the deduction rate. So decisions are made once the desires of both
sides meet. Other factors such as the relationship between the negotiating parties also matter
the decisions. Therefore the decisions basically do not take equity consideration. Funds for
some services highly consumed by the poor may be heavily reduced if they are not retained by
the local government, and therefore leads to the service deficit or even insufficient provision.
Differentiated User Charge Standards According to Income Level
Bahl and Linn (1992) have a point that the optimal user charge should differ among
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consumer groups according to their incomes. The direction and extent of divergence of the
price charged to each consumer (group) from marginal costs depends on the shadow price of
public revenue, the income of the consumer and its weight of income distribution, and the
price-elasticity of demand. Bahl and Linn further point out that the socially optimal price will
lie above (below) the marginal cost price, as long as consumers are above (below) a level of
income at which public revenue is judged equal in value to private income. This is consistent
with our equity consideration, that is, lower income groups that are less able to afford to pay for
the urban services should not have to pay as much costs, while higher income groups that can
more easily afford to pay should pay more to support the public goods. It may hurt the
efficiency of urban services provision, but the loss will be compensated by the gains on equity.
In fact to differentiate fees standard according to income level is a very effective way to
enhance the urban public service usages of the poor so as to improve equity. At the
development phase, the user charge is levied on developers rather than individual consumers, so
the user fees could be differentiated according to the target home buyers. Their income
information may be collected through customer surveys, or the user charge can be adjusted by
the overall score of the housing quality implying by unit size, building type, landscape,
community facility, etc. Nevertheless, it is a pity that among our interviews and data collection,
no Chinese cities we researched have this kind of fees differentiation policy. We still need to
wait till further development of the structure and level of user charge policy. But it provides us
a possible method for the future.
The user fee policy has the potential to play an active role to aid the equity objective in
Chinese housing development. There are some effective methods we can enhance or apply in
the future to complete the structure of the policy, aiming to help poor people make use of public
services.
4.3 Infrastructure & Support Service Fee: A Case Study
In this section, we pick the infrastructure & support servicefee27 as a case study to discuss
in details. In our interviews, this fee is one of the highest fees developers concern about, which
is clear in table 4-1. It is widely imposed in cities across the country. It encompasses a few
typical problems in real estate user charge levies. And it involves a lot of State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) activities that add to its complexity. As the fee's content and price standard
vary in cities, we choose the infrastructure & support servicefee in Shanghai to discuss. In this
relatively well regulated city in China, we are able to avoid too many noises and to observe some
pioneering approaches.
4.3.1 Regulation about the Infrastructure & Support Service Fee in Shanghai
Similarly as other Chinese cities, Shanghai started to bundle many services related to
housing property together to charge a single infrastructure & support service fee in housing
development in 1987. There is no uniformed regulation about this fee in all cities, but it
generally consists of infrastructures such as public roads, utility connection, and support services
27 Pei tao fei
Fig. 4-1: Important Legal Clauses of Current Infrastructure & Support Service Fee in Shanghai
1. The fee standard is 320 yuan per square meter. It is levied on all housing construction in
urban districts and rural counties.
2. This fee is collected for urban infrastructures including: public roads, storm and sewage
system, water connection, gas connection, bus stops, telephone communication, part of
construction fee of sewage farms specifically serving for housing projects, and etc.
This fee is also collected for public facilities including: grain management office, market
management office, post office, housing management office, management and maintenance
office, gas business service address, sanitation office, land acquired for public toilet and
community park, neighborhood committee, police office, community committee, day care,
primary school, middle school, and kindergarten.
3. The charge does not include: hospital, culture center, theater, neighborhood commercial
shops, gymnasium, library, senior care, civil welfare housing, amusement center, and etc.
These projects should be planned and financed by related department, and constructed by
construction department. Or if they are accord with planning requirements, they can be built
by the housing development company based on the principle of "who invests, who benefit".
4. The development company should apply for construction license from planning departments
and service provision from water, electricity and gas providers according to their payment
receipt. For those who do not pay the fee, the service provision will be put off, and 0.5% fine
per day will be charged.
5. Shanghai Municipal Housing Development Bureau is responsible for managing this fee,
inspecting the compliance, and solving issues in the implementation.
6. This fee has earmarked usage. The payment should be made to Shanghai Municipal
Housing Development Bureau to a separate bank account. It should be used on housing
development related infrastructures and support services with comprehensive adjustment
among all the items.
(Source: Shanghai Detailed Rule on Levying Housing Construction Infrastructure & Support
Service Fee, 1996 and Announcement to Terminate Collecting Commercial Network Construction
Fee included in the Housing Construction Infrastructure & Support Service Fee, 1999)
such as hospital. These are public services either important to housing construction, or
necessary for future new community life. The reason a single infrastructure & support service
fee is encouraged and became popular across the country probably because it aims to improve
efficiency without dealing with these services one by one, whereas the result needs to be
inspected.
The basic regulation implemented currently is Shanghai Detailed Rule on Levying Housing
Construction Infrastructure & Support Service Fee28 launched by Shanghai Municipal
Construction Commission in 1996. The government eliminated commercial networks
originally included in the fee in 199929 and reduced the price to 320 yuan/m 2 from 363.75
yuan/m2 . Combining the 1996 Rule and the 1999 amendment, some important points of current
policy are showed in Fig. 4-1.
4.3.2 Transaction Costs Discussion and Associated Problems
Though negotiation cost and enforcement cost are inevitably associated and observed in the
collection of infrastructure & support servicefee in Shanghai, we focus on the transaction cost
of identifying transacting parties, cost of pricing the service, and government cost in this section
because these costs are especially notable in this fee and are specifically coupled with practical
problems.
Costs of Identifying Transacting Parties and Double Charge Problem
From the Clause 2 in Fig. 4-1, we see that among the 320 yuan charged for the
infrastructure & support service fee, there are some money paying to water connection, gas
connection, and telephone line connection. In China, the actual providers of these services are
28 Shanghai shi zheng shou zhu zhai jian she pei tao fei shi shi xi ze
29 Announcement to Terminate Collecting Commercial Network Construction Fee included in the Housing
Construction Infrastructure & Support Service Fee, 1999
normally provided by just one water company, gas company, and telephone company in the city,
which are all SOEs. But this fee is levied and collected by the government directly, specifically,
the Shanghai Municipal Housing Development Bureau. And then the Bureau assigns the
revenue back to the water, gas, and telephone companies respectively. At this point, the
provider side of the transacting parties is not clear. And costs of identifying transacting parties
are involved.
In practice, this conflict leads to a double charge problem to developers. As a real
provider but not direct payment receiver, the SOEs usually have to wait for at least a few months
before they get their payments back from the government. So sometimes SOEs, such as the
municipal waterworks, come in and charge the developer directly even if the developer has paid
to the government. Due to the monopoly position of SOEs, the developer cannot refuse to pay
them because their services are critical for housing development. In this situation, the
developer double-pays the SOEs and the government.
Being informed this problem, Shanghai government allows the double-charged developer to
get refund from them with the receipt of payment to the SOEs. Nevertheless, it usually takes
developers more than half a year to one year to get their refund. During this period, the extra
burden of double payment hurts the liquidity of the project and increases the development costs.
And there is no guarantee that the developer can get back 100 percent of their payments made to
the government. All the developer's loss and the cost of coordinating between the developer,
the government and the SOEs are related to the costs of identifying transacting parties.
Cost of Pricing the Service and Refund Problem
In Fig. 4-1 we notice that the Rule simply lists the items included in this fee (see Clause 2),
but it does not claim the single price of each infrastructure or service. The reason may be
because the government tends to retain the ambiguity of pricing so as to leave flexibility to
interpret the Rule in their best interests in various conditions. Clause 6 (Fig. 4-1) shows that
this fee will be distributed to finance each service after comprehensive balance implies another
possibility, that is, even the government may not be totally clear about the pricing policy
themselves.
Some services may incur high transaction costs to price them. For instance, schools
cannot simply be priced by the construction and maintenance costs because their aggregated
materials costs may be far lower than total private and social benefits, which are unfortunately
not easy to estimate. Bus services may not be easy to price because as part of the urban
transportation networks, it can be used by any passengers in the city. In fact not only in
Shanghai but all Chinese cities do not provide separate price for each service in this
infrastructure & service support fee.
A refund problem is a byproduct of the pricing issue. Generally these public services and
facilities should be built and managed by the district or city government. However, it is quite
common that the government requires the developer to build public facilities such as primary
school and take over the control when the construction is finished. Practically Shanghai
government agrees if developers build any public facility originally included in this fee, they can
come with evidence to ask for refund for the relevant contributions. For example, if there is an
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agreement between the developer and the government that X yuan/m 2 will be spent on building a
primary school, then when the developer constructs a primary school in their site, they should be
able to have X yuan/m 2 deducted from user charges paid to the government. However, without
knowing the price for each service, it is uncertain how much the developer can take back. And
of course, negotiation costs accordingly increase when the developer tries to negotiate the refund
amount with the government.
Government Cost and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Problem
First type of government cost is to refine the regulation. In our interviews, we heard
complaints from developers whose project was required to build a senior care center.
According to Clause 3, senior care is not included in this fee, which means the developer cannot
apply for any compensation from the government. Actually senior care has similar public
attributes as kindergarten, and is very different from commercialized amusement center. But
kindergarten is included in the fee, while senior care is excluded all together with amusement
center. The government may reconsider if it is suitable not to finance important public service
such as senior care center but have the developer to bear its cost. It may be inappropriate to
leave senior care centers to the private sector because this service may not be provided
sufficiently as it is probably not profitable. Government cost is invested here to take
comprehensive considerations and make appropriate adjustment to the policy.
The second type of government cost is related to SOEs. SOEs that we are referring to here
are particularly the public utility providers such as water, gas, electric and telephone companies.
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Government costs involved in the infrastructure & support service fee are not only to facilitate
the services offered by the government, but also to those provided by the SOEs that are
governmental organizations in some sense.
The SOEs are separate entities aside of the government nevertheless they are supported by
the government in many ways. As the utility SOEs provide services but not the direct revenue
receivers of the infrastructure & support servicefee, it leads them to an awkward situation and
accordingly involves government cost to mediate the conflicts. When the SOEs come to the
government to get back their payments, it is possible that they may not be assigned total revenue
and have to negotiate with the government for their share of the revenue. When some of the
SOEs charge developer directly, the government has to set up a refund procedure to take care of
the double-charging problem, which is also government cost to moderate the conflicts between
the SOEs and the government.
Government costs also incur to improve the working efficiency of the government and
especially the SOEs. The SOEs may be technical inefficient when providing services. As
government supported organizations, these SOEs are not entirely financially independent of the
government. They do not have much profit maximizing incentives and technical efficiency
initiatives. The developer has to communicate with the Enterprises, deal with their technicians,
and even work as coordinators between different SOEs when they have timing or technical
conflicts. Those actions bring extra costs, which is paid by the developer to enhance the
functions of SOEs.
Extended Discussion about Public Utilities
Originally in many cities, by paying the infrastructure & service supportfee the developer
would be provided all the connections and installations of water, gas, electric power and
telephone. As many conflicts and inefficiency occur between the government and the public
utility SOEs and incur high transaction costs, some cities have been trying to separate those
services provision charges from the infrastructure & service supportfee, and leave them with the
SOEs directly. These reforms are carrying out in different cities at different levels. For
instance, in Yantai this fee counts for the connection and installation 30 of electric power and gas,
but only the connection of water. In Shanghai, as we have seen in Fig. 4-1, it only counts for
the connection of water and gas but separate most of the services, which are the connection and
installation of electric, and the installation of water and gas in the construction site. The
connection charges are left to the SOEs. In these transactions, the SOEs play a role more like a
business company than a government organization despite their monopoly status. The services
are priced by the Enterprises and revenues are collected directly by them too. Each of the items
has clear unit price, the base is usually the building floor area (Table 4-1, item 33-44).
However, there are still pricing and technical efficiency concerns with these transactions.
As we mentioned, each Chinese city has only one SOE in charge of gas, water, power, and
telephone service respectively. So they are the monopolies in the market. As these enterprises
do not have other SOEs or private companies as market competitors, they may weaken market
3 Connection of utility is to connect the project site to urban networks; installation of utility is to extend utility
networks within the site.
function and dampen fair service pricing. Although the price may be moderated by the
government who wants to encourage the real estate market growth, many developers still
complain that the prices are too high. High prices may also because without market
competition, the SOEs lack incentives to improve industrial efficiency in terms of resource
allocation, human capital utilization, and profit-maximizing.
A famous case of introducing market competition is the telecom industry in China. China
Telecom was the sole State-owned telecommunication company before mid-1990s. In 1994,
the foundation of China Unicom broke down the previous monopolized market. Once it
entered the market, despite its small market sharing of several points in the early years, it
stimulated the market competition and had significant impact to decrease price. Under the
pressure of contest, the average price of Chinese telecom products such as cell phone services
dropped a great deal. In 2004, ten years after China Unicom's formation, it increased its market
share to 35 percent, and brought Chinese market intense competition and fairer pricing.
The introduction of competition may greatly challenge current SOEs, but in the long term, it
will improve the industrial efficiency and maximize the welfare of the society. Nevertheless,
the government has to consider introducing market competitor prudently. Important as utilities
are to all the residents in the city, any changes of this market may have critical impacts.
Long Term / Short Term Suggestions
In the short term, without changing the institutional settings, the government may refine the
Rule. They may differentiate which are public facilities and which are better to be privatized.
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They should also declare the price of each item to solve the refund confusion. It may incur
costs of pricing these services to the government, but it will save both the government and the
developer a lot of negotiation efforts. The government should improve their efficiency to
smooth their revenue transfers to the SOEs so that the developer does not have to be double-
charged.
In the long term, two issues should be considered. The first is the roles of the utility SOEs.
They are apparently in an awkward situation during the transaction of this fee. The government
may think about separating the utility connection from installation. The utility connection
services are to connect the site to urban networks, with contains the attributes of public goods, so
that it may be fine for the government to take care of it directly. The utility installation in the
site only serves the future home buyers, so it may be appropriate to commercialize them by
leaving them to the SOEs as their independent business.
The second issue is the purpose of collecting this fee. We see both the infrastructures and
public facilities are tightly related to properties. This is also the reason that these fees are
bundled together. The government charges these fees to finance these urban public services.
But is it fair to only charge new housing projects but ignore old residential development? If this
one-time charge can finance the establishment of those facilities, what is the financial source to
maintain them? How to finance these facilities in the old urban area with new development is
infrequent? Without a property tax, this user charge is now working as a substitute. These
problems and conflicts cannot be solved by user charges. The government may think of other
public finance instruments, such as the property tax, for the very long term.
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Besides, market competition is the key point to improve the efficiency of the SOEs. It
may be appropriate for the government to consider introducing other competitors. Since utility
is a vital source of urban life, it may be more convenient for the government to support new
SOEs as market competitors so that it has the control over the quality and quantity of service
provision. Private sector may join the market under government supervision and plays an
important role too. They will bring in not only inter-company but also public-private
competitions to the market, improving the efficiency of services provision.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
In the previous chapters, we have reviewed the background of off-budget finance in Chinese
cities, presented facts about the current user charge practices, analyzed the costs incurred in use
fee transactions, evaluated the efficiency and equity contributions of the current system, and
illustrated important issues in details by a case study of a single fee. Based on all the research, I
would argue that user charge is an important financial instrument for urban public services such
as water, gas, electricity and sewage, whereas the current market is bearing a lot of transaction
costs due to the incomplete legislation and limitation of institutional settings. We summarize
several findings about the real estate user charge practices in Chinese housing development
research as follows:
5.1.1 Important Financial Source at the Local Level
As a result of the existing dual-track financial system in China, the user charge is a major
source of extra-budgetary funds for the government, and important revenue retained at the local
level. The real estate development, mainly consisting of housing projects in China, is a
significant sector for the local government to collect user charge revenues as a complement of
relatively low tax collections from in this industry. The user charge revenue contributes greatly
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to support local public service expenditures such as infrastructures, public utilities, and public
facilities, which are important to local economic growth.
5.1.2 Tolerable Transaction Costs
We observe all five types of transaction costs in the user charge practices in the housing
market. They are the cost of identifying transacting parties, cost of pricing the service, cost of
negotiation, government cost, and enforcement cost. These costs are incurred because of
limitations of the system, for example the incomplete legislation, inexplicit regulations,
administrative conflicts, distortion of policy implementation, and the lack of inspection and
monitoring. The current transaction costs are, to some extent, tolerable to developers and
central and local governments because the current real estate market is thriving so that these
charges are moderated in comparison to the relatively high returns in this industry.
5.1.3 Noteworthy Efficiency and Equity Contributions
Real estate user charges in housing development contribute to urban efficiency and equity
improvement to some degree. In the efficiency aspect, charging user fees may optimize the
allocation of precious resources and avoid excessive consumptions and service provisions. It
may also guide real estate investment decisions by indicating the market trend. In the equity
aspect, the user charge revenue possibly enables cross-sector subsidies. It can benefit the poor
by promoting public goods with high income-elasticity and low price-elasticity. It may improve
urban equity by imposing different user charge rates according to varied income levels.
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Potentially the user charge may play an important role to improve urban efficiency and equity,
although its current efficiency and equity effects are limited due to market imperfections.
5.1.4 Improvable Institutional Settings
Comparing to remarkable economic reforms, we feel the institutional settings may not be
able to make enough changes to catch up with the rapid property market growth in recent years.
Some critical limitations such as ambiguities in policy making, inter-governmental conflicts, and
monopoly status of SOEs might have dampened the efficiency and transparency of the user
charge system, which accordingly have prevented further progresses of the housing market. As
important as economic reforms, the change of institutional settings should be considered
carefully and comprehensively. In transitional economies, like China, gradual reforms may be
expected.
5.2 Recommendations for Future User Charge Reforms
According to our observations of current issues in the user charge system, we have several
recommendations for future user charge reforms. Considering the complexity and gradualism
of user charge reform, we recommend both short-term and long-term strategies.
5.2.1 Short-term Strategies
1. Fee consolidation. Small fees, such as planning permission license fee, construction
permission fee, and completion archiving fee, incur relatively high transaction costs in
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compliance and collection. The government may be able to coordinate internally among
departments and offices to consolidate several small fees. Since these fees are mainly paying
for government management and service, as more local governments recognize their service
functions other than regulatory power, they may consider eliminating these fees all together.
2. Legislative guideline. The inexplicit regulations are very common in the cities where
we conducted our interviews. Though the Chinese government has been enhancing legislation
for user charge practices, the result of implementation may not be satisfactory. Many conflicts
and negotiations are caused by the ambiguity of the legal documents. Hence, the government
may set up a guideline for legal documents enacting and ensuring the clarity of regulation
clauses. The guideline could work as a template to guide the legal documents for specifying
which aspects of the fees should be stated explicitly and how detailed the document must be.
For instance, it could require the regulation to declare the price of each sub-item, or should
describe the criteria for determining the deduction and the related rate.
3. Monitoring institutions. Independent monitoring institutions should be set up. They
should have two functions. The first is to supervise the operations of user charge practices,
preventing any government department, agency, or individual officer from imposing illegal
levies. They will be responsible for inspecting fee pricing, official corruption, fee evasion, and
other dissensions. The second is to act as an intermediary between developers and decision
makers. It provides all developers equal opportunities to report their feedbacks and complaints,
avoiding only having major voice from big companies. Members of the monitoring institutions
should compose of independent and impartial third parties.
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5.2.2 Long-term Strategies
1. Legislation completion. The completion of user charge legislation is a vital task in a
long-term consideration. Well defined regulations are expected to help regulate the transactions.
For the long run, the focus is not only to establish a single regulation, but to accomplish the
overall institutional restructuring. The government may aim to develop an integrated set of
legal system, including authorization, approval, and monitoring processes. They should match
with economic development and serve economic activities efficiently. They should also
enhance the transparency of the system.
2. SOEs restructuring. Since SOEs play an important role in providing urban public
services, they involve heavily in user charge activities. The restructuring of SOEs is important
for improving the public service provision. The reform may address issues related to technical
efficiency, resource allocation, and administrative reorganization. The government may also
gradually invite public and private competitors to the market, while the overall supervision is
very critical to ensure sufficient and qualified service provision.
3. Policy integration. As part of the fiscal framework, current user charge system is
deeply rooted in the entire fiscal structure of China. It is changing along with the changes of
the national financial system. The user charge strategies and other fiscal policies impact each
other interactively. In the long term, we may be open to the possibility of using other financial
instruments such as property taxes for funding some public services, such as education. The
choice of future financial instruments will determine the efficiency of the entire fiscal system.
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The contributions as well as hindrances of the user charges to housing development in
China are rooted in the special era of its transitional economy. Policy designed for improving
the user charge system should be based on the particular circumstances in China. Reforms
should proceed according to the evolution of the entire institutional environment and are
expected to be gradual.
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